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1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of dispute resolution systems for international 
organizations is of growing importance. Not only has there been 
a plethora of new international and regional organizations created 
in the last few years, but this trend is likely to continue. There 
are numerous proposals for multilateral free trade areas and 
agreep1ents across Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in 
Asia. 1 At the same time, existing international trade organiza­
tions have come under increasing scrutiny for their inability to 
reflect accurately the needs and concerns of the citizens of the 
member states. 
For example, the debate about fast track authority for the 
Clinton Administration reflects concerns about the benefits of 
free trade agreements to the U.S. economy and fears that in­
creased free trade with less developed states will lead to an elimi­
nation of jobs in certain manufacturing sectors.2 This debate fo-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. J.D., 
Harvard Law School; A.B., Princeton University. I would like to thank Jeffery 
Atik, Steve Charnovitz and Frank Garcia for their insightful comments and 
questions. John McDonald and Sara Cobb also provided helpful feedback. An 
early draft of this Article was presented at the conference Linkage as Phenome­
non: An Interdisciplinary Approach, sponsored by the International Economic 
Law Interest Group of the American Society of International Law. I appreciate 
the valuable comments from the conference participants. Many thanks also go 
to Maria Cheryan and Emily Canedo for their superior research assistance. 
1 See, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, "Americas Agreements"-An Interim Stage in 
Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63 (1997) (discussing implementation of the Free Trade Area); Paul A. O'Hop, Jr., 
Hemispheric Integration and the
,
Elimination of Lez_af Q_bstacl�s Ul!der a NAFTA· 
Based System, 36 HP..RV. INT L L.J. 127 (1995) (d1scussmg Importance of 
NAFT A to the establishment of the free trade zone in the Western Hemi­
sphere); Merit Janow, Assessing APEC's Role in Economic Integration in the Asia· 
Pacific Region, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 947 (1997). 
2 Fast track allows the President to negotiate trade pacts and submit them 
to Congress for up-or-down votes, with no amendments allowed. See Peter 
Baker & Paul Bluestein, Clinton Searches for Middle on 'Fast Track', WASH. 
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cuses on whether it is even in our citizens' interests for the United 
States to join international trade organizations. Meanwhile, 
across the Atlantic Ocean, the ongoing debate about the 
"democracy deficit" in the European Union ("EU") demonstrates 
the concern with the decreased ability of citizens to have a say in 
what the laws are under the EU.3 This debate focuses on the abil­
ity of citizens to influence lawmakers in the substantive laws that 
directly affect their lives. In both of these debates, people have 
examined the legitimacy of international trade organizations and 
debated ways of structurin� these organizations to be more demo­
cratic and more legitimate. 
POST, Sept .  1 1 ,  1997, at AS. Fast track supporters argue that without fast track, 
it would be impossible for the United States to conclude deals with other na­
tions because tfie agreements are subj ect to Congressional approval. Many na­
tions are hesitant to negotiate agreements when they know that Congress can 
reopen them in the approval process and force further negotiations. See, e.g., 
Bo5 Dole & Lloyd Bentsen, Editorial, 'Fast Track' Issue Deserves Fast Action, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at A3 1 .  Supporters of fast track generally favor in­
creased free trade. Those opposed to fast track are those more doubtful of the 
benefits of free trade and harmonization of standards, including labor and envi­
ronmental groups. See Linda Clerkin, Shut Up and Take Your Medicine: Will 
International Laws Force Vitamins Off U.S. Shelves? CITY EDITION: THE WKLY 
NEWSPAPER OF MILWAUKEE, Nov. 20, 1997 ("We believe that each nation's 
needs are unique, and it shouldn't be up to an international group to decide 
what laws best govern that nation. It should be up to those nations them­
selves.") (quoting Susan Haeger, Executive Director of Citizens for Health pro­
testing harmonized guidelines for vitamins and minerals under CODEX) . For 
a discussion that l inks current trends in international trade and the economy 
towards strengthening the argument for fast track, see the viewpoint by the 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for international economic policy from 1989 
to 1993, in Thomas J. Duesterberg, Selling the Free·Trade Story, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct .  5, 1997, at BU9. For a view of whether fast track is necessary to accom­
plish trade pacts, see David Sanger, The Trade Bill: The Impact, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 1 1 ,  1997, at A6, and also see Lori Wallach , Fast Track Trade A uthoritv: 
Who Needs Fast Track?, J .  COM. ,  Sept . 19, 1997, at 9A. Although fast tra�k 
authority was not granted last year, It is clear that the debate over free trade in 
general and fast track in particular will recur. 
3 See, e.g., J .H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J .  
2403, 2466-74 (1991) . Weiler's article describes "democracy deficit" as the abil­
ity of the unelected branches of the EU, the Council and the Commission to 
pass legislation overriding laws passed by the national parliaments. In other 
words, it is possible for Citizens of a certain member state to be required to fol­
low a law for which neither they nor their duly elected representatives voted. 
Democracy deficit also refers to the comparative lack of political power in the 
only elected EU body, the Parliament. See generally A nne-Marie Burley, De· 
mocracy and judicial Review in the European Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 8 1  (1992) (examining the roles of legislative and judicial bodies in the EU). 
4 For example, the Environmental Side Agreement of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") was designed to assuage concerns about in-
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This article takes a different approach to understanding ques­
tions of legitimacy and democracy in international organizations5 
by examining the dispute resolution mechanisms used in these or­
ganizations. An alternative method of assessing legitimacy and 
democracy in international organizations would be to look at the 
ability of private actors to enforce rules once they are enacted. 
Ulti:mately, I shall argue that increasing individual involvement in 
dispute resolution-by granting privare actors rights and standing 
under these organizations-is an appropriate way to increase the 
J.e£itimacv of international trade organizations . 
. _, Secti;n 2 of this Article reviews the general argumems sur­
rounding democracy in international organizations. I will exam­
ine the increased role of private actors in international law as ad­
vocated by liberal international relations theory, the arguments 
surrounding the democracy deficit in the EU,o and the issue of 
capture by narrow political interests reflected in the debate over 
fast track authority. 
In order to understand different levels of individual involve­
ment in dispute resolution, Section 3 of this Article examines 
some facrors in determining different types of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. These factors-direct effect, standing, supremacy, 
transparency and enforcement-all reflect different levels of in­
volvement between the trade organization and the citizens under 
lt. 
The Section 4 of this Article makes the argument that in­
creased individual involvement will increase democracy in these 
trade organizations. This involvement will increase the role of 
private actors in lawmaking, make enforcement of the original 
trade agreement more likely, reduce the danger of capture by nar-
adequate enforcement of environmental laws in Mexico and the resulting con­
cern about a "race-to-the-bottom" -the fear that companies would relocate 
there in order to take advantage of the lax enforcement. See North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) . 
5 In an attempt to give some definition to ambiguous and critical terms, I 
use the term "legitimacy" to refer to the lawfulness and appropriateness of these 
international organizatwns, as well as the perceived fairness and justice resulting 
from these agreements. "Democracy" refers to the representative and participa­
tory aspects of international organizations. 
6 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for 
signature Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 1 1 , (entered into force Jan. 1 ,  1958) 
[hereinafter the EEC TREATY]. 
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row interests, increase the transparency of these trade organiza­
tions and, in the end, make organizations themselves more effec­
tive. Finally, Section 5 concludes the Article. 
2. DEMOCRACY il'.J INTERNATIONAL 0RGANIZA TIONS 
There are three critiques of international organizations that 
can shed light on the involvement of private actors. 
2.l. Liberal lnremational Relations Theory 
The first argument comes from the liberal international reb-. ' ("' .b 1 IR") f . . . 1 . h. 1 ' twns tneory , 11 era o pohtlca SClence, '!l, 1cn has now 
been more regularly applied to international law.1 Liberal IR ar: 
gt:es that previous international relations theories, such as realism8 
I . h 9 b d . h . t' . ana regune tJ. eory, are too state- ase 1n t .e1r assessrr1ent o In-
ternational relations. Liberal IR focuses on the actors behind the 
veil of the state, looking at how the state is organized and who 
has power, in order to understand the motivations and interac­
tions of states in the international realm. In examinin g  dispute 
resolution, several proponents of l iberal IR have l ooked at the 
Europe�r system and the role of private actors for explaining its 
success. Furthermore, scholars have focused on how interna-
7 See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, lnrernational Law ,md !ntenwtional Re­
lations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993) (propasing applica­tion of "liberal" international relations theory to international law); Anne­
Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International R.e!ations Theory 
and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTE!v1P. PROBS. 
377 (1994) (discussing liberal conception of the United Nations); David P. 
Fidler, LIBER TAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the Helms-Burton Act From 
Within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
297 (1997) (using liberal IR to examine U.S. legislation). 
8 See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Pro­
spectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE }. INT'L L. 335,336-38 (1989); see also 
Burley, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing realism theory). For more on apply­
ing realism to international trade see generally ROBERT GILPIN, U.S. POWER 
AND THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (1975), and HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS 
AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (5th ed. 1973). 
9 See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL REGIMES (1983) (Stephen D. Krasner ed.); 
Friedrich Kratochwil & John G. Ruggie, International Organization: A State of 
the Art on an Art of the State, 40 INT'L ORG. 753 (1986); Burley, supra note 7, at 
218-20. 
10 For a Kantian explanation of liberal governance and the relation to in­
ternational trade, see ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT /WTO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 23-24 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication 107 YALE 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/14
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rional relations theories might reflect themselves in different dis-
pute resolution models in a variety of international trade organi-. 11 u 
zatwns. 
This article attempts to build on -chis body of work by using 
• 1 1 . ,. - ]'1 1 Tp 1 d. Cf d i f' . the ma1or oe11ets ot .wera1 1-'-"- to eva.uate u erent mo e1s o m-
ternati�nal dispute resolution. Liberal IR argues that (1) private 
actors are the fundamental actors in society; (2) governments re-- , j ('") I 1 d' fleet some segmer;t of: society; anc) \j states oenave accor mg to 
· r · � ··�' · · l · h h · ' · then pre1erences. ,_ 1 his arne e exammes t e extent to w .1ct1 pn-- • 1 - • • l I. I • - • vate actors are g1ven roles m mternatwna mspute reso!ut10n and 
the irnpact this h;;;_s on che international organization as 'vell as 
• 1 • T '11 . h d'ff i. then· ciomestlc government. 1 w1 exarmne _ow 1- erent mspute 
resohltion models result in diff�rent segments of society being d ' . . _] 1 l'ff J 1 represente . oy the1r governrr1ents ana now 01. erent mooe1s re-
£1 1 I • 1 (' lect ana change state act1ons ana prererences. 
2. 2. Democracy Deficit 
A more direct l ine of attack on the legitimacy of international 
organizations comes from many of the scholars focusing on the 
EU. The argL1mem here is that, as power has been centralized in 
the EU and as laws are increasingly passed at the EU level, citi­
zens cf member states actualiy have less ability to influence legis­
lation. D \V'hat started as a union of democratic states actually ''re-
L.J .  273 (1997); Ernst-U!rich Petersmann, ConstitutionaL ism and InternationaL 
Organizat ions , 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 398 ,  424-27 (1997) ; Walter Mattli & 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Constructingthe European Community LegaL Sys tem fmm 
the Ground Up: The RoLe of IndividuaL Litigants and National Courts (Harvard 
Law School, Harvard JeaE Monnet Chair Working Papers, No. 1195), available 
at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair (visited Apr. 4, 1998) 
<http:/ /viWW.law.harvard.edu/Programs/J eanMonnet/ > . 
11 Kenneth W. Abbott, 'J7Je Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Funct ions of the 
Law of International Trade , 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 50 1 (1985) (applying realist 
theory to international trade); Frank J. Garcia, Decis ionmaking and Dispute 
Resolution in the Free Trade A 1'ea of the A mericas: A n  Essa)' in Trade Governance, 
18 NiiCH. J. INT'L L. 357 (1997) (applying mesoinstitutlOn theory to the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas); G. RIChard Shell ,  Trade Legalism and Interna­
tionaL ReLations Theory: A n  A nalysis of the Worid Trade Organ ization ,  44 DUKE 
L.J. 829 (1995) (setting forth three models of dispute resolution based on three 
theoretical premises) . 
12 See Burley, supra note 7, at 227-28. 
1:; See Weiler, supra note 3; Weiler, et al . ,  European Democracy and Its Cr i­
tique-hue Uneasy Pieces (Harvard Law School, Harvard Jean Monnet Chair 
Working PaDers, No. 1/95), avaiLabLe  at Jonathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet 
Chair (vtsited Apr. 4, 1998) <http:/ /www. law.harvard.edu/Programs/ 
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sults in less democracy for their citizens. In order to remedy this 
deficit of democracy, some argue that citizens must be given more 
direct representation at the EU level through the Parliament. 
Some of the reforms of the European Parliament in the Single 
European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht are explained by the 
desire to give citizens more direct voice in EU legislation.14 Oth-· 
ers argue that the EU has tried (unsuccessft1lly) to ease concerns of ' b d l . l . . 15 ....-,• . ctemocracy y greater transparency an'- 1eg1s atlve rev1ew. �.ttl-
zen participation in trade policy has also become a focus of cnvi-­
ro�r:rtental and public interest gro�.1ps looklng at U.S. trade pol 
• 10 • l G l A . ...., I d � "ff ("G 1\ ,.......,..,,\ 1 1 J.cy m tne - enera greement on 1 race an 1 an s I>. 1 1 ; 
' 1 W' ld � l 0 . . (''V'{''�O") 18 and tne · or 1 rac.e ·. ·rgamzatl on ,· " '  1 . 
JeanMonnet/ > .  
1 l To partially remedy the democracy deficit, the Maastricht Treaty ere· 
ated a co-decision procedure,  which essent1ally gives the European Parliament a 
legislative veto on some matters. See TREA 1I ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNI1I, Feb. 7 1992, art . 1 89b,  O .J. (C 224) 1 (1992) ,  [ 1992] C.M.L.R. 573 
(1992) [hereinafter EC TREA 11]; see also Alan Dash wood, Community Legisla­
tive Procedures in the Era of the Treaty on European Union, 1 9  EUR. L. REV . 343 
(1994) (discussing changes to legislativejrocedures resulting from Treaty on 
EU); Trevor Hartley, Constitutional an Institutional Aspects of the Maastricht 
Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 ,  224-26 (1993) ;  Dieter Kugelmann, The 
}.Iaastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMP. L.J .  335 ,  346-48 (1994) (discussing relationship between the Treaty and 
democracy) . · 
15 See, e.g., Juliet Lod�e, Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 J. 
COMM. MKT. STUD. 343 � 1994); Imelda Maher, Legislative Review by the EC 
Commission, in NEW LEGAL DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN UNION 235,  238-240 (Jo 
Shaw and Gillian More eds . ,  1 995) .  
16 See, e.g., DANIEL C. ES1I, GREENING THE GATT (1994) ;  Daniel C .  
Esty, NCO's at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Ex­
clusion, (forthcoming 1998) (manuscript on file with author) ;  Patti Goldman, 
The Democratization of the Development of United States Trade Policy, 27 
CORNELL INT'L L J. 63 1 (1994) (arguing that the secrecy and lack of publ ic in­
put in U.S.  trade policy results in a policy that is biased toward trade liberaliza­
tion at the expense of other values) ; Robert F. Housman,Democratizing Inter­
national Trade Decision-making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699 (1994) (discussin» 
undemocratic nature of international trade decision-making) ; Paul B. Stepha;, 
Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 
Nw. J. INT'L L.  & Bus. 681  (1997) . Furthermore, in response to complaints 
about lack of transparency, a U.S .  District Court ordered the United States 
Trade Representative to grant public access to submissions to GATT dispute 
resolution panels . See Public Cttizen v. Office of the United States Trade Rep­
resentative, 804 F. Supp. 385 (D .D.C. 1992) .  
17 General Agreement on  Tariffs and Trade, Oct . 30, 1 947, 6 1  Stat. A3 ,  5 5  
U.N.T.S. 1 87 [hereinafter GATT]. 
18 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Mulitlateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15 ,  1 994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE 
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However,  a focus on the democracy deficit alone is too nar­
row. In this view, the level of representation of private actors is 
solely measured in the legislative process. Yet the legislat ive 
prowess is o nly part of the equation.  Lawmaking also occurs in 
the judicial b ranch of the EU, through the European Court of 
Justice. Additionally, the greatest changes in breadth, scope, and 
oower of the EU have come from the Court, not from legisla-
1 .  19 Th f 
. . , . d 
. 
d d ttor:. ere ore, tt ts a1so appropnate-an m ee necessarj-tO 
examine who has the power to compel judicial change. In the 
EU, ironically , its citizens have the greatest ability to participate 
in the dispute resolution process. Instead of a democracy deficit, 
the EU comes closest to achieving democracy in its dispute reso-
1 • 1 • d h . . 1 l • tUtlon mecnamsm compare to ot er 1m:ern;H1ona. tr::we orgam-
zat10ns. 
2.3. Trade Liberalism Versus Political Capture by Narrow 
Interests 
A final critique of international trade examines the relati on­
ship between the state and its constituents. It is widely believed 
that trade liberalism, while making economic sense to most states0 
is difficult to implement in the face of nationalist interests.2 
First, at the U.S .  political level, it has been argued that the execu­
tive branch is the logical protector of free trade, while Congress is 
more likely to want to protect narrow, industrial, protect ionist 
interests.21 Therefore, it is important that the President be given 
power over trade policy so that the broader economic interests of 
the state, and consumers and expo rters in particular, will be pro­
tected from the well-funded, well-organized importer lobby. Sec­
ond, o n  the international level, it has been argued that less trans-
URUGUAY Round vol. 1. (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement]. 
19 Weiler, supra note 3, at 241 1 -20. 
20 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Trade and 
Democratic Values, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 9, 17-18 ( 1992) (explaining 
Adam Smith's and David Ricardo's economic theories in favor of a hberal trad­
ing system). 
21 See DANIEL VERDIER, DEMOCRACY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 275 
(1994); BETH V. YARBROUGH & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION 
AND GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 1  (1992); C. O'Neal Taylor, 
Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the NAFJA Turned 
Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. lNT'LL. & ECON. 1, 18-21 (1994). 
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parency for trade deals is useful in shielding trade agreements 
from scrutiny of these national interests.22 
Again, I suggest that this analysis of international trade rela­
tions overlooks the important dimension of dispute resolution. ��� r 1 1 h d 1 k ' 1 ne concerns ot capture are not only preva1ent at L.e _ ea manng 
staz:e . \XIhether or not a trade agreement is enforced clearl';' brings � , , � all of the same elements to the table.-- Enforcement can separate 
interests along the i mporter-exporter divide, along the ma�·mfac­
turer-consumer divide, between industries, or between contpanies. 
Different methods of dispute resolution can either recogniz-e or 
. ; . c ?4 1gnort cne Issue 01 capture.-
· -- � 1  . , ..L i . . . l 1• 1 . l n_e mvo1vement ot pnvate acwrs m tne cilspute reson.1t10n 
..... -. p. ,-.. L ..... , : r 7 r'- t - ct' ,...., . ; .. - � h (" ·t 1 � ,·· 1-. ; 1 ...... -:- -r + ,.. .,� �.) ..-! "I r 0 .,_ 1 0 1 11�'---Ll"-L l.)!ns o r a e organlZaLOllS d a� ne ctu .. ll 1 L�.J ":·.'-,U·�'- tn'-
linkage between trade and domestic political interests.L) \)/hile 
' . 1' 1 .  ,. 1 ., b -ttleoretlca!ly trus llnK allows governments to e more respons1ve 
to their citizens, in reality, the link between trade and politics 
keeps governments tethered to special and well-organized interest 
22 See Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the 
World Trade Organization, 17 U PA. J. INT'LECON. L. 295, 319 (1996) ("It carr 
be argued that the low public profile of international trade poli�y has been one 
of the largest contributors to trade liberalization over the past fihy years."). 
23 See Horacia A. Grigera Naon, Sovereignty and Region,tfism, 27 LAW & 
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1073, 1075 (1996) (arguing that supranational dispute settle­
ment can "transcend the day-to-day political maneuvering of member states, lo­
cal bureaucracies, and interest groups"). 
24 "The nature of these [GATT] proceedings is not over conflicts of inter­
ests among countries but between the general Interest of consumers in liberal 
trade and the general interests of the taxpayers in an efficient government and 
the interests in trade protectionism. They are about redistribut�on of  income at 
home." ASIL BULLETIN, No. 9, IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROLIFERATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATORY BODIES FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4-4 
(1995) (statement of Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann) ; see also John H. Barton & Barry 
E. Carter, International Law and Institutions for a New Age, 8 1  GEO. LJ. 535, 
550, 560 (1993) (arguing that individuals ought to be able to enforce and invoke 
internat ional law) . 
25 By using the term "political interest," I am denoting those negative con· 
notations of narrow, speCial or otherwise inappropriate interests that can cap­
ture the polity. For more general information on public choice theory, see 
DAN1EL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); 
CHARLES K. ROWLEY & WILLEM THORBECKE, THE ROLE OF CONGRESS AND 
THE EXECUTIVE IN U.S. TRADE POLICY DETERMINATION: A PUBLIC CHOICE 
ANALYSIS IN NATIONAL CONSTITU110NS AND 1NTERNA110NAL ECONOMIC 
LAW (Meinhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds . ,  1993);KAY SCHLOZMAN 
& JOHN TIERNEY, 0RGAN1ZED INTERESTS AND AMERICA DEMOCRACY, 339-
46 (1986); Paul B. Stephan, III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory 
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 745 (1995); 
Symposium, Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167-518. 
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groups. 
26 Once a state has determined that it is in its national in­
terest to join a trade organization and once rules are adopted un­
der that organization, the link to domestic political interests can 
be reduced by giving private actors standing to enforce the agree­
ment . In that way governments will  be responsible for following 
the rules across the board rather than selectively.27 
3. FACTORS IN DETERN!INING 1viODELS OF DISPU"l"E 
RESOLUTION 
' T 1 .• t f h ' ' ' ' ' l"·Jow that 1 n2.ve set rortn some o c e cnt1ques ot tt'te lnt-erna-
. • . L . . , b . , .  twnal trade syst:o:m, l:;Jls A.rtlcle can turn to etter understandmg 
'. I . • T 1 1 • L • 1 f the d1sp1ne resouxcton opr1ons. �n oraer to  determwe U.!e leve, o 
individual involvemem �here are several factors to exarnine.23 
3.1. Direct Effect of Rights 
3.1.1. Definition 
The first factor is whether private actors are directly granted 
rights under the international treaty establishing the trade organi­
zation . The term "self-executing" comes from the idea that the 
treaty executes itself without further legislative action.  For those 
who study EU law, the rights under the Treaty of Rome and 
26 See Jeffery Atik, Identifying A ntidemocratic Outcomes: A uthenticity, Self 
Sacrifice and International Trade, in Symposium, Linkage as Phenomenon: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, 1 9  U. PA.]. lNT'LECON. L. 201 ( 1998). 
27 For more on how private actors can enhance government compliance, 
see Iv1att Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for Interna· 
tiona! Trade Agreernents to Peifonn Constitutional Functions with Respect to Sub­
Federal Governments?, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 609 ( 1996-97) . 
28 The factors listed in this section are no doubt incomplete. Other factors of 
inquiry could include the precedential value of decisions, whether the decision is 
subject to review or appeal, and whether the panel is rotating or standinp. See, e.9. Louis F. Del Duca, Teachings of the European Community Experience JOr Devel­
oping Regional Organizations, 1 1  DICK. J. lNT'L L. 485 (1993) ; Philip M. 
Nidiols, GAIT Doctrine, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 379 ( 1996) ;  Miquel Montana I 
Mora, A GAIT with Teeth: Law Wins 01Jer Politics in the Resolution of Interna­
tional Trade Disputes, 3 1  COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 03 ( 1993) . I have chosen 
not to discuss those factors because they focus on those dispute resolution systems 
that already have some sort of decision-making body. Th1s study takes a broader 
approach and does not assume the existence of any such tribunal. 
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other legislation have been called "directly applicable"29 and are 
said to have "direct effect. "3° For the ourposes of this Article, the 
d'ff l h l L . . , 1  b 1 • d 3 1  d 1 erences among the t ree pnrases w11 e over oo ke t ,  an I 
will use the term "direct effect" to mean those treaties that give 
private actors immediate rights and under which no further do­
mestic legislative action is necessary. 
3. 1 . 2. Hl'hy Directly Effective R ights A re lmpOYtant 
D. 1 f( . . h . . . 1 1recLy e rect rve ng1 ts z,re an !rnponant 1ssu.e 1n treaty ta-y;;-, ' 1 1 h ' . ' 1 '  1 r1 " oeca1Jse t r1e scope ana aept ot the  uee1.ty wLl vary aepen..J.mg o n  
h h • ' 1 1  ' I • I ' • 1 • 1 w et1 er pnvate actors WI also be mvolved 1n tne lmp .• err.tenta-
• .C L T 1  · 1 1 · ' · t1on 01 t ne t reaty . .l nose t reat1es unoer w mch pnvate acto rs get 
. h . h . ' ' j b . r , ng" ts g1ve t ese pnvate acto rs anotner lega_ as1s o:: protectmg 
their rights under the law. 
The issue of direct effect globally has most commonly arisen 
under human rights treaties, which are clearly drafted in order to 
protect and benefit i ndividuals.32  In the United States, the con­
tinual debate over self-executing treaties re-emerges every time a 
new human rights treaty comes up for ratification in the U.S .  
Senate. The Senate is traditionally reluctant to  grant direct effect 
to these treaties because these treaties may provide additional 
29 See Case 26/62, N.Y. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie O nderneming 
Van Gend en Laos v. Nederlandse Administratle der Belastingen, 1 963 E. C.R. 1 
[hereinafter Van Gend en Loos]. 
30 See Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato v. Sim­
menthal SpA (II) ,  1978 E.C .R. 629; see also, Ronald A. Brand, Direct Ef ects of 
International Economic Law in the United States and the EU, 1 7  Nw. J. INT'L L. 
& Bus. 556 (1996-97) ; Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect ": A n  Infant 
Disease of Community Law, 8 EUR . L. REV. 1 55 (1983) . For discussion of 
"direct effect" see T. HARTIEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN 
COMMUN1TY LAW 1 83-2 1 8  (1988) . 
3 1  This is not to say that the difference between direct apolicability and di­
rect effect is not important or has not occupied many pages oi academic discus­
sion. See, e.g., J .A.  Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct 
and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 425 
(1972) . 
32 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or  De­
grading Treatment or Punishr .. cnt, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 1 7 1 ,  (entered into force Mar. 23 ,  1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948 ,  78 U.N.T.S .  277; see also David Weissbrodt, 
United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 lvliNN. L. REV. 35  
(1978) (discussing the Human Rights Covenants and President Carter's propos­
als for them) . 
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rights not provided under the Constitution.33 In keeping with the 
Senate's t raditional isolat ionist approach to foreign relations, the 
idea that international law may differ or go further than U.S .  do­
mestic law remains anathema to many members of Congress and 
other citizens.34 Thus, when the United States recently ratified 
the International Covenant on C ivil and Political Rights 
("ICCPR") , the United States made a specifi,c: reservat ion stating 
that the ICCPR would not be self-executing.)) This has been t:he 
typical practice with most recently ratified human rights treJ.ties. 
International trade treaties in the United States are also tradirion-
1 '  lt . 36  T' 1 !  d d , . . l . , ally not se .-executmg. . ney usua  y nee a mtwna Implement-
33  For example, the ICCPR calls for the elimination of the death penalty for juveniles under 1 8 .  The Supreme Court ,  on the other hand, has held that 
the death penalty is permitted against j uveniles to the age of 1 6 .  See S;:anford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) ;  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 8 1 5  ( 1988) .  
While many countries around the world have eliminated the death penalty, the 
United States has expanded its use. See International Comm'n  of Jurists, Ad­ministration of the Death Penalty in the United States, 1 9  HUM . RTS. Q. 1 65 
(1997) . 
34 See, e.g., U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH 
OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS, (Richard B. Lillich ed. , 1981) ;  M. Cherif Bas­
siouni, Reflections on the Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights by the United States Senate, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 169 (1993) 
(discussim: the U.S. concerns in ratification of the ICCPR); Kerri Ann Law, 
Hope for /be Future: Overcoming jurisdictional Concerns to Achieve United States 
Ratijrcation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 62 FORDHAM L.  REV. 
1 8 5 1  (1 994) (discussing the reasons the United States should ratify the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child); Ann Elizabeth Mayer,Rejlec­
tions on the Proposed United States Reservations to CEDA W· Should the Constitu­
tion Be an Obstacle to Human Rights?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 727 ( 1996) 
(discussing the U.S. reaction to Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women); Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding 'Fraudulent' Execu­
tive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 257 ( 1993) (discussing the U.S. decision to make 
ICCPR non-self-executing). 
35 The ICCPR was adopted by the United States on September 8 ,  1 992. 
The U.S. Senate gave the requisite advice and consent to the treaty, together 
with the declaration "[t]hat the United States declares that the provisions of Ar­
ticles 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing . . . .  " 13 8CONG. REC 
S4,784; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 109 1 -93 (1994) (setting forth the implementing lan­
gua�e of the Genocide Convention). 
6 See JOHN H JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 79-105 (1997) (discussing 
broadly U.S. law and the application of international trade treaties); John H. 
Jackson, U.S. Constitutional Law Principles and Foreign Trade Law and Policy, in 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 65 
(1v1einhard Hilf & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (reviewing the history 
of the application of trade treaties in U.S. law). 
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mg legislation or rule-making in order to have any force m do­
mestic U.S.  law. 
On the other hand, when we discuss trade organizations, the 
private actor involvement is particularly appropriate .  After all, 
states intend to design trade treaties to encourage private �ctors to 
import and export from other private �ctors.  In order to encour­
age th is trade, treaties require that states do not take actions that 
�would adversely affect these private ac t o rs .  Historicallv, the verv j � J 
basis of friendship, commerce and r1;wis-ation treaties was to D ro-L, • • 1 • fi . ,. r . 1 vwe p rotect l O n  or pnvate actm·s t r o n1 uni?.J r  govelTiill-':rtta! 
. .... o·::· t" r-n o �"'t -�\JO at thf' lo"''est t· .c..., rF'- 1 o r  .-�r·�-- T} -., -0 � (" .. •[ r; · ... e �  ... ? e  ... • ' r:  �� ... ;_ [ ! , . -. o . l  '- 1 1  . . � . e n . _ w _ · " ' �- ·� �' •., <... U .  <-.� l l . l �  . • l L , ,  .. ,�dOH, "-' •  
hr:ual investment treaties today recuire that Fovenunents ueat 
.. l ..._, . . I . . 1 j  � . k c ru zens ana nonCitlzens equaLy. :)tates grant pnvate acto rs t t, esc 
. 1 . 1 • 37 . . . � . r1 -n g nts as nat 10na. treatment or  a r u m mu m  standar._, o± t reat-
3 3  . t h ,..., l. . . . . l ment 1n t ne . 1ost state .  U nce state;; c�.zoose to j Olfl 1nterna�1ona 
37 The notion that individuals granted rights under national treatment will 
receive the same treatment as the state's nationals is referred to as the "Equality 
of Treatment Doctrine." Though gaining popular support -;1,rorld wide, it has 
been the doctrine historically preferred by communist and Third World na­
t ions. "Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation" between the U.S. 
and other nations used the national treatment standard. See, e.g., Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953 ,  U.S . -Japan, art. IV, para. 
1 ,  4 U.S.T.  2063 , 2067. ("Nationals and companies of either Party shall be ac­
corded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to 
access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies 
within the territories of the other Party . . .  both in pursuit and in defense of 
their rights.") .  
3 8  According to the Minimum Standard of Internat ional Justice, a state 
must accord an alien with at least a minimum standard of treatment, even ;J this 
means an alien would receive better treatment than the stale's own nationals. 
This doctrine was traditionally favored by Western nations, particularly viith 
regard to states with a poor record on human rights. However, third world na­
tions have feared that the use of a minimum standard will be used as a cover for 
privileged status with regards to investments, inheritance and ownership of 
property. See Greta Gainer, Nationalization: !he Dich ... otomy Betwe�n _Western and Thzrd World Perspectzves m lnternatzonal .Law, 26 How. L.J. b4/ (1983) .  
Interestingly, more recent U.S. treaties combine both the  national treatment 
and the mmimum standard. For example, in the one Treaty of Friendship with 
Belgium it is written that 
Each Contracting Party shall at all times accord equitable 
treatment and effective protection to the persons, p roperty, 
enterprises, rights and interests of nationals and companies of 
the other Party . . . .  Nationals of either Contracting Part� 
within the terntories of the other Party shall be accorded fuJ 
legal and judicial protection for their persons, rights, and in­
terests. Such nationals shall be free from molestation and 
shall receive constant protection in no case less than required 
by international law. To this end they shall in part icular have 
' !  
j 
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uade organizations, the requirement of  fair treatment fo r nonciti­
zens includes freedom from unfair taxation, unfair government 
reo-ulation, unequal tariffs and unequal nontariff barriers . Basi-· 
cally, trade treaties provide a set of rights for private actors against 
governments .  
Yet,  trade treaties are currently structured so as to p rovide 
. . L b 1 J f  [ h . . . 1 h . states these ngets on ena. 0 1 L e1r C1t1zens ratner t u an grantmg 
these rights directly to the citizens . Because trade treaties .most 
f,. . . , k 1 h . , h a rect pnvate actors< 1t only rna es sense tnat L ese n g l1ts , ave ao-
;.. . ) 9 .- . f d ' 1 ....... 
J.. 
propnate remedies . i\s Steta.n Riesen el arg'ued almosr nventy-
right of access, on the same basis and on the same conditions 
as nationals of such other Party, to the courts of justice and 
administrat ive tribunals and agencies in ali degrees of jurisdic­
tion and s hall have right to the services of competent persons 
of their choice. 
Treaty of Friendship,  Establishment, and Navigation, Feb . 2 1 ,  1 96 1 ,  U.S.-Belg. ,  
arts . 1 ,  3 (1) , (2) , 14 U.S .T.  1 284, 1286, 1 288-89; While in an investment treaty 
with Argentina, it is written: 
Eac.h Party shall. permit and t.reat investment, and ,activities as­sociated tnerewtth, on a basts no less favorable tnan that ac­
corded in like situations to investment or associated activities 
of its own mti.onals or compar:-ies, or ?f nationals or con:;pa­
mes of any thtrd country, whtchever 1s the more favoraDie, 
subject to the right of each Party to make or maintain excep­tions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed in the 
Protocol to this Treaty . . .  Investment shall at all times be ac­
corded fair  and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection 
and security and -shall in no case be accorded treatment less 
than that required by international law. 
Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Invest­
ment, Nov. ,  1 4  199 1 ,  Arg-U.S. , 3 1  I .L.M. 124 .  
39 As Andreas Lowenfeld stated, 
I have never believed that a right without a remedy is no right 
at all. But there can be no doubt that the closer a legal system 
comes to affording remedies for breaches of mles, the stronger 
are the rights it confers, and the more reliance can be placed 
on the mles. 
Andreas Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with R ights: Institutional Reform in the New 
GA IT, 88 AM. J .  INT'L L .  471 ,  488 (1994) .  For more o n  rights without reme­
dies in the domestic context, see Richard H .  Fallon, J r. , lndividual R ights and 
the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L. REV. 343 (1993) (giving context to indi­
vidual 's rights in a structured society) ; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Melt­
zer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 Hl\.RV. L. 
REV. 173 1 (199 1) (examining the concept of "new" law in criminal cases from 
the perspective of the law of remedies in the constitutional context) ; Donald H. 
Zeigler,_ Rights Require� 
Remedies: A New Approach to the t;nforcement of R ights 
m the federal Courts, J8 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987) (argumg that courts must 
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five years ago, direct effect of rights and proper judicial remedies 
are necessary to the continued development of free trade .4° Fur­
thermore,  without appropriate remedies, these rights often are left 
unprotected and unenforced. Increased legitimacv and effective­
fle;s of international trade organizations requir; individual in­
volvement, not . only at the . sta�f of lawmaking, but also at the stage of remedymg lawbreakmg. · 
3. 1 .3. How Rights Become Directly E;]ective 
T • . - T �. � -- - 1... , h � . ·- !� "' 7u . ,.. � _j ,... � � � • . ,_ � - .  �, · 1  ;_n ITlail} SlJ.Le:> O L l H .. r t '"'n L u'- Dhcu :) L ,.tt e:>,  lD.Lern< L l O , _tCcL 
'i· :-c..� . ...  : � r  D - �- · .... l i - i -� e: · ....:::. ..-. -- .  �- : .  · ,..... ) · - ·r ; f: .... � · <· r,- ...---. -. -;-c l i.. CcL t '.. :> ar. .. autorna,_IC "· - "Y S eu - � Xc<.. '-" L .t D.g a.D.u ) at 1 ::h, .tCC. d O , i ,  ;:', '· •J. t l c  
· , - r: · . . . : 1 , ., ]  • ; h e · .  h · c • .� ] :  � . � )-, ,  • - c. . � - · - J.: -- - � - -L 1t.l l V .t G ucu Clt,zenS t. H .. ng . •  L> O U Li ! !1eG lil u.� ll <- <hf OD L . .  l c.: :::> o. .� :i. e 
?asis as �he �tate it_self. Languag� grar_lting indivi4ual_ rif1tns cmcl�r 
mte rnauonaJ t reaties can be outlmed m the constltutlon · - o r  l e? ts-
. ,  . 43 s ' 1 1 . . , .  'd  1 . h d ·'-'. latlo.n .  tl . • other states grant mcuv1 ua ng ts un er ueat 1es 
through the evolution of judicial decisions that have held the 
rights to be self-executing or  directly effective. 44 In the United 
States, for example, the U.S .  Supreme Court held t hat a Japanese 
individual was granted rights d irectly under the Treaty of Friend­
ship, Commen;:e and Navigation signed between Japan and the 
United States .4) S imilarly, although direct effect was not clearly 
presume enforcement of a law absent a showing that greater harm will occur to 
a plaintiff from enforcing these rights) . 
40 See Stefan A. . Riesenfeld, Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 
22 AM. J .  COJ\·1P. L. 415 ,  443 (1974) . 
4 1  In fact , the American Bar Association ("ABA") supported expanding the 
right of private parties to bring cases under NAFTA. See Int'l Law and Pract ice 
Section, American Bar Ass 'n, Reports to the House of Delegates, 26 INT'L LAw. 
8 5 5 ,  859 (1992) .  See also, Joint Working Group on the Settlement of Int ' l  Dis­
putes, Canadian and American Bar Ass 'ns, SettLement of Disputes Under the Pro­
posed Free Trade Area Agreement, 22 INT'L LAW 879 ( 1988) (proposing a refer­
ence procedure from national courts in which individuals could bring cases to a 
Joint Canada-United States Free Trade Tribunal) . 
42 See STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art . 9 1  (Neth .) .  
43 For example, under the law o f  the United Kingdom, "although the ex­
ecutive has a largely unfettered power to enter into treaty obligations, such ob­ligations normally need to be tra!l�f�rmed in!o do�estic law . oy legislation be­fore they can be enforced by Bnttsn courts. · Ntcholas Gnef, Constztutzonal 
Law and International Law, in UNITED KINGDOM LAW IN THE M.ID-19905 
76,88 (John W. Bridge et al. eels., 1 994) .  
44 See Etat Belge, Ministre des Affaires Economiques c .  Societe Anoyme 
Fromagerie Franco-Suisse Le Ski' ,  Cour des Cass. ,  158  Pasic. 1971-I (1971) 
(Belf) (ruling on the sup_rema�y of the self-executing treaties over _n_ationa� law) . 
See Asakura v. Ctty ot Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 ( 1924) (detatlmg sutt of a 
Japanese national by the City of Seattle for the ability to open a pawn shop) . 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/14
1998] T)EMOCiZA CYA ND DISPUTE RESOL UTION 60 1 
written into the Treaty of Rome, the European Court of J ustic� 
("ECJ") found that the rights in the treaty did have direct effect.4o 
Under case brw frorn i:he ECJ, citizens of member states of the 
EU are also granted rights di�ectly from EU legislation.47 This 
direct effect Ender the Treaty of Rome is already qu)te revolu-
. . • . . ' • -t8 -
nonary m companson w most 1nternat1 0nal treaties.  Because 
1 • r . J • !( • l . rne practiCe or granting cu rect ertect vanes oy state,  1t 1s necessary 
The Court quoting language fro m che �n.�aty, "[t]he cit izens . . .  of e:;.ch of the 
High Contracting l)arties sha.ll ha,_:.� the l ibercy t o  . . . res ide in -che Ierritories of 
the oth�r to carr; on trade . . . " held in  favor of  the Japanese natio��! .  Jee id. at 
1 '0 l-o r. - roo ·· e on sal £! � X "'C 1 1  ... 1 D0 · ··Q··- te- '''•e Tordan T p"' l�' Set!( " x" �  .. , � , � o  ) ;- . ..:. ' V J.  l i l  1 l \.... .l -�;:_ ... , . ..... •�· ·� .. :.. O t! ..... ,•. L J, J e  � J . � c;. 1 ,  ,) 1.,. '  j � L.· ·� �. V.; /._ ., f t.0 
Treaties, 82 l\.M J. INT'L L. 760 ( 19 :.)8); Carlos ivlanuel Vas'lues ,  The Four Doc­trines ofSelfExecutmv Treatie?, iSS! Aivl .  J .  INT'L L.  695  (1 995) . See also Charles 
D. Siegel, IndividuafR ights Under Se(f:Execu t ing Extraditzon Treaties-Dr. A l­
varez /v!achain 's Case, 1 3  LOY. L .A.  INT'L & COMP L. J .  765 (1991) (detailing 
case ruling that a Mexican fugitive wanted for a U .S . murder who was kid­
napped had to be released because Mexico had protested under its rights under a 
treaty) .  
46 See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E .C.R.  1 .  This decision was controversial at 
the t ime and, it was argued, beyond the scope of the ECJ.  See id. , at 19  
(Opinion of the  Advocate General Karl Roemer) (protesting the  decis ion) ; P.P. 
Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Dmct Effect and the Federalization of EEC 
Law, 12 OXFORD J .  LEGAL STUD . 453 , 45 8-63 (recounting criticisms of the 
case) . 
,47 The ECJ has interp reted the bnguage of Article 1 89 as conferring rights 
up on the nationals of Membe r  SLues in certain circumstances. The direct etfect of the le�islation, treaty article, or decision is, in essence, what constitutes 
.
the 
right. The Court has dist ing uished vertical direct effect, the rights of an indi­
vidual to sue a governmental ent i ty,  fro m horizontal direct effect, the right of 
an individual to sue another individ;_:ai . The Court has acknowledged vertical 
direct effect involving disputes arising from treaty articles, regulations, and di­
rectives. See Van Gend en Loos, 1 963 E.C.R .  1 ;  Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente :Nazi­
onale per L'Energia Elettrica, 1 9 64 E.C.R.  585; Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home 
Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1 337; Case 1 52/34, Marshall v. Southampton 8(. S. -W .  
Hampshire Area Health Auth . ,  1 986 E .C .R .  72 3 .  However, the  Court has not 
been so lenient on the rights of individuals established by horizontal direct ef­
fect. Although the Courts have recognized horizontal drrect effect in disoutes 
arising from treaty ar·ticles 2.nd regulations, Case 43/75, Defrenne v. s;ciete 
Anonyme Beige De Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455 ,  the Court re­
fuses to acknowledge horizontal direct effect in disputes arising from directives . 
See Case 106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Commercial Internacional De Ali­
mentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. I-4 1 3 5 .  
4 8  See Brand, supra note 30 ;  David O'Keefe, judicial Protection of the Indi­
vidual by the European Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J .  901 (1996) ;  
Louis F.  Del Duca, Teaching of the European Community Experience /or Develop­
zng Regional Organizations, 1 1  DrCK. J. INT'L L. 485 (1993) . In fan, the EU 
does not provide direct effect for other international treaties indudinP' the 
GATT. See Brand, supra note 30, at 575-93 (1997) . o 
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to examine the language of the treaty, the member states' prac­
tices, and any judicial interpretations of the treaty. 
3. 2. Standing Before the Dispute R esolution Body 
3. 2. 1. No Standing 
�J 1 • l 1  , . - 1 .-l b i nder some treatH�s,  a.1  mso:..1tes are reso .veu etween states 
'Chrough diplomacy. Alternativ�l.y, the dispute resolution system 
is :;. court or tribunal that is only open to stat es,  as is the cas'= ·with 
·.-L, �  T •· �n� r ·o� ·' 1 Co· ,.,. o f J , � -r : e "'  ("T(' T ") -;::;- "01 v .no- +ro th •. : ... C e n  tel a l .! l cl l . u, L L U:> '- -�- \ }. ,_;J • -'-' y 1 11 b "' rn e 
Permanent Court of Arbitrat ion , b the ICJ i s  t he most recognized 
· • 1 :lO I ' � 1 '''"I' Q ·r� ·  S mternat1ona1 cou rt .  n the n::J.c,e arena, t.n e  'i/ 1. •._ LJ 1 spute et-
dement Understanding is closest to r.his type of international ad­
j udication.  In either instance, private actors have no official role 
in dispute resolution. 
Historically under international law, only a state could sue 
another state and demand reparation for the injuries intlicted on 
its citizens. The injured private actor did not have a directly en­
forceable claim against a state that violated his rights . ) 1 There­
fore , it was up to each state to determine if, when, and how to 
press claims for injury to its own _citizens. 52 A state could clearly 
L • · d ::>3 cnoose not to pursue th1s reme· y. 
49 On July 29, 1 899, at the first Hague Peace Conference, the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration ("PCA") was estabbhed. The Convention for the Pacific 
Settlement of International Disputes detailed the PCA, which was to become 
the first dispute settlement mechanism between sovereign states . See Bette E. Shifman, The Revitalization of the Permanen t Court of A rbitration,  23 INT'L J .  
LEGAL INFO. 284 (1995) . 
50 The Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ") was established 
in 192 1 by the League of Nations. The Court, heard 32 cases and issued 27 ad­
visory opinions to international organizations. At the end of \V'orld 'X'ar II, 
the establishment of the United Nations (UN) sparked the need for a new 
world court in consideration of concerns by the parties who were not signato­
ries to the League of Nations. The new world court, the International Court of 
Justice was, thus, formed in 1945 .  See Statute of the International Court of Jus­
tice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 .  
5 1  See Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.) , 1927 P .C. I.J . (ser. A) No. 6,  at 
2 8  Quly 27) (Merits) . ("The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules 
of international law in force between the two States concerned, and not the law 
governing relations between the State which has committed a wrongfui act and 
the indiv1dual who has suffered damage.") .  
52 The Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that: 
It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is 
entitled to protect 1ts subjects, when injured by acts contrary 
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Private suits in domestic courts were also not an option. 
j ' 1 h 1 "  • 1 d I • 1 l. ld Manv states nad 1aws t .at �tmtteC1 groun s on whtcn t r 1ey cou 
be s�ed in their own courts which meant that foreign investors 
• 1 ' • 1 l )4 T:' • ,. • had lmle recourse to th.at etomestJc ega system. r: '.r-en 11 a pn-
vate acto r wanted to bring a suit in his own home court against 
• 
j 1 d h .l ' 1 "d  1 the fore1gn state,  most aeve10pe states ,_aa laws tnat provv ea . . . 55 r � . h d foreis:n sovereign 1mmunny. �Yloreover, pnvate act o rs 1a' no ..., • 1 . . h ,· ' . . , 1 • internauon::h n::co urse m t . e case or a vtolatwn by tne1 r own gov-
ernrnem. 
Toc.b,y) under a trea.t:y \vith no standing for private actors,  pri-
� ...., .- - · _.  .. .  1 .  -- �J - ..... ; � t , .... L - - � .... r- L ,.. � ,  1 _ l. i · - . . l · vate aCLOfS "" <:;; L!l l0 1 Vcu u ,;,y .o cLi.e eXLeil l  L <i <it tney k• •) Dj '. n e l r  
h . . l < • • o-ove rnments to represent L.e1r mterests ano. to p rote ct t t1 e 1 r  w-
o . r• I - r ' • 1 I .  ' ·u . I c " . . dustnes. c�'<;?rnp ,es ot thlS ·;;v-ou.a be the ' mrect .)t ates negouatmg 
to international law committed by another State, from whom 
they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the or­
dinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects 
and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial 
proceedings on his befialf, a State is in reality asserting lts own 
rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect 
for the rules of international law. 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J .  (ser. A) No. 2 ,  at 1 3  (Aug. 
30) (Jurisdiction) . 
"' See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (involving U.S .  gov­
ernment refusal to espouse the claims of the plaintiff a�ainst the government of Saudi Arabia) . Individuals have traditionally been able to request that their 
government espouse their claims before the ICJ or other international court. 
See Lotus, (Fr. v. Tur.) , 1927 P.C.I.J . (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept .  7) ; see also David M. 
Reilly & Sarita Ordonez, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the Internat ional Court 
of Just�ce on National Courts , 2 8  N.Y.U. J .  INT'L L. & POL. 135 (1?96) 
(analyzmg U.S. Crtlzens Lwmg zn Nzcaragua v. Reagan and the demal of mdt­
viduals to bring a case in front of the ICJ) . 
54 In most countries the government had full sovereign immunity both in 
law and in practice. See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Government and Officers: 
Sovereign Jmmunit')', 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963) ; see also United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (stating that the United States may only be sued by its own 
consent) . 
55 See, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S .C.  § 1 604 
(1994) ("Subject to ex1sting international agreements to which the United States 
is a party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be im­
mune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States except as provided 
[in the exceptions]. ") ;  State Immunity Act, 1 978, ch. 33 (Eng.) (granting immu­
nity in the United Kingdom to the sovereign) . 
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. 
b ' l  k 56 
. . . h wnh apan to open 1ts automo 1 e rvar et or negot1atw.g w1t 
Russia regarding regional i nvestment . )7 
3. 2. 2. Petition Domestically for Government to Represent 
A second option is that p rivate actors have the right to peti­
tion their governments to b ring a dispute to the system. \X/hile 
private actors do not have the opportunity to directly bring their 
�ases , r.he government may be persuaded through formal mecha.­
nisms that a dispute is sufficiently serious to warrant their atten­
t ion.  The closest example of this in the United States is the so--., 1  . " d " f h T T • • (' T d R . c,a_L:_�r.,},� \proc� 
. 
ure o r  t e � mted Jtates �a e . epr�sent�t!ve 
( ' U,') _ll\. ) .  \'V mle the state Stlll makes the fmal deCiSlO!l aoout 
• l b '  h h � 1 1 • whetner or  not to nng sue a case, t ere are torma m ecnarnsrns 
for private actors to become involved at the domestic level in this 
' ·  1 . 59 B h US�R' d . . h mspute reso utwn system. ecause t e 1 s enswns L av e 
56 See High Level Talks Slated with Japan on Auto Agreement, 14 Int'l Trade 
Rep. (BNA) 17 14  (Oct . 8, 1 997) . 
57 See U.S., Russia Sign Cooperation A ccords, Focus on Investment in Russia 's 
Regions, 1 4  Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1 633 (Sept. 24, 1997) .  
5 8  Section 301  allows an individual t o  petition the United States govern­
ment to initiate trade dispute resolutions. Under Section 302 a party can peti­
tion the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate a foreign government's poi i­
cies or practices that are suspected to be hindering trade. See 19 U.S .C .  §§ 24 12-14 (1994) . The USTR, under section 304, must investigate and determine if the 
fore1gn government has violated a trade agreement, benefits of any trade agree­
ment are unreasonably being denied to the individual, or the foreign govern­
ment is unjustifiably burdening or restricting U.S. commerce. See id. § 2414 .  If 
the dispute involves a trade agreement the USTR is obligated under section 
303 (a) (2) to first use the dispute settlement procedures provided under rhat 
agreement. See id. § 241 3 .  For example, if a dispute involves infringements 
based on one of the Uruguay Round Agreements, the USTR must utdize the 
dispute resolution system of the World Trade Organization. If the USTR finds 
that a trade infringement is occurring and is convinced that the dispute should 
involve action by the United States it will pursue resolution of the dispute. 
The EU also has a procedure whereby private actors can request the EU take 
action against those governments violatmg free trade agreements. See Council 
Regulation 3286/94, 1 994 O.J .  (L 349) 7 1  [the Trade Barriers Regulation] 
Oaying down EU procedures in the field of common commercial policy) . 
59 Out of the 23 section 301  cases initiated by an individual between 1985 
and 1996, 1 1  GATT panels were established. See C .  O'Neal Taylor, The Limits 
of Economic Power: Section 301 and the World Trade Organizations Dispute Set­
tlement System, 30 V AND. J .  TRANSNAT'L L.  209 (1997) . See also A. Lynne 
Puckett & William L. Reynolds, Current Development, Rules, Sanctions and 
Enforcement under Section 301; A t  Odds with the WTO?, 90 AM. J .  INT'L L. 675 
(1996) (detailing conflicts between Section 301 and WTO policy) ; Jared R .  Sil­
verman, Multilateral Resolution over Unilateral Retaliation: A djudicating the Use 
of Section 301 before the WTO, 1 7  U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L.  233 (1996) .  
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not been reviewed by the judiciary,60 a private actor seeking dis­
pute resolution of his claim in this manner will l ikely have no re-
'f  'I US"'n d . ' k . course 1 tne 1 I\. ec.tdes to ta .. e no actwn. 
3. 2. 3. Individual A rbitration 
Private actors can also be granted standing before an interna­
tional arbitration board. Such a dispute resolution mechanism . d '  ' . d' 1 rf d b · · h oermrts stan· mg tor onvate act o rs 1 rect v a  ecte y laws m ·c .e J.. l � 
state in which they a re investing.  The move toward investment 
h . . 1 • 1 ' . f h l . 1 ,... r arL itratwn oegan wltn tne creation o t1 e nternatwna 0entre o r  
' � 1 r - -, · (" T"SID"\ d 1 . tne �ettlement m lnvestmem l;;sputes .lG ' ) un e r  t ile aeg1s 
f 1 -·(/ ' d D ] 61 ., h d 1 J . b '  . o tne v orJ. .u anE. J.n t ." -e rno e 01 1nvestment ar 1trat1on un-
' I,.......STD . ' . . ICS r-- h oer \...., 1 , pnvate actors C:c�1 onng cases agamst states . Iv 1 as 
jurisdiction over any legal dispute arising out of  an i nvestment be-
• 1 • 1 f h b 6 )  tween a member state ano. a natwna. o anot er mem er state. -
To initiate proceedings under ICSID, a party must submit a writ­
ten request to the Secretary-General of  ICSID detai l ing the issues 
in dispute, the parties, and consent to arbitration. Once certified 
by the Secretary-General of ICSID, a p rivate actor can have the 
case heard by an arbitral panel established by ICSID .63 This 
model of permitting private actors to bring cases against states has 
60 The USTR has discretion in determining whether to initiate investiga­tions from the petitions filed by interested individuals. See 19 U.S .C.  § 24 12 (a) 
(2) . If the USTR decides not to investigate, notice of such a determination with 
an exylanation of reasons must be published in the Federal Register. See id. § 2412(a) (3) . But see Envin Eichman & Gary Horlick, Political Questions in In· 
ternational Trade: judicial Review o(Section 301, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 735 (1989) 
(arguing that a denial by the USTR to pursue investigations of an individual's 
petltion should be reviewed by the judic1ary) . 
61 ICSID was established by the Convention on the Settlement of Invest­
ment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signa· 
ture Mar. 1 8 ,  1965, 17 U.S.T. 1 270, 575 U.N.T.S. 1 59 [hereinafter ICSID Con­
vention]. See also Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute 
Settlement Procedures: The Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 633, 655-56 ( 1995) .  
62 See ICSID Convention, supra note 6 1 ,  art. 25 .  The parties must, how­
ever, consent to the use of the arbitration facility. !d. The use of ICSID has 
not been initiated by a Contracting State in complaint of an individual of an­
other Contracting State even though the potential exists under the Convention 
provisions. See David A. Solely, ICSJD Implementation: A n  Ef ective A lternati·ue 
to International Con;1ict, 19 INT'L L. 52 1 (1985) .  
� . 1 h See ICSID ConventiOn, supra note 6 1 ,  art. 36. Un ess t e Secretart.-
General finds that the dispute falls outside the jurisdiction of ISCID, he w!ll 
register the request and notify the parties. See id. art. 36(3) . 
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("NIERCOSUR", or  the "Common lVIarket of t he South") also 
modeled its system of dispute resolution upon the EU where pri­
vate actors can go to either the MERCOSUR court or their na­
tional court . 70 
\Y,f e cannot underestimate the impact of individual i nvolve­
ment in i nternational dispute resolution.7 1  Private actors play the . .L . r . J 77 i\ � "b . 1mportant mnct10n ot pn vate en1o rcement agents . - n.s sue 1, pn-
vate  ac"t o rs can themselves ensure that th e law is being followed 
rather than relying on states or an oversight body (such as the 
Cornmission in the case of the E U) to b ring a case.  States may 
r 1 ., b · · 1 f 1 • reel reluctant to nng cases agamst otner states o r  some·wnat nH-· 
n o r  infractions as the diplomatic ramificuions may not be wonh 
·the trouble. Furthermore, it may be in many states'  interests not 
t o  follow the letter of the law exactly or to take their time in 
litigation between an individual and a government entity) . Horizontal direct 
effect conclusively exists in issues involving conflicts arising from articles and 
regulations of the Community. See Defrenne, 1 976 E .C.R.  455 .  However, the 
question of horizontal effect m conflicts ari�ing over directives has not been as 
favorable. See Case 9 1/92, FacC!m-Don v. Recreb, 1 994 E .C .R.  3325 
(confirming the traditional view that horizontal direct effect does not exist in 
disputes involving directives rather than following the Advocate General 's ad­
vice to further the scope of direct effect) . If the mdividual is denied access to 
the ECJ to sue another individual, he may still have an opportunity to com­
mence an action against the Member Stare for noncompliance with Commu­
nity law by not properly implementing the specific directive. See Case C-
106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 
[ 1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 ( 1992) (Spain) (emphasizing that the States have a duty to 
implement directives in a manner so as to achieve the intended result of the 
Community as closely as possible) .  
70 See MERCOSUR: Protocol o f  Bras ilia for the Settlement o f  Disputes, 
Dec. 17 ,  199 1 ,  reprinted in 36 I .L.M. 69 1 ;  Cherie O 'Neal Taylor, Dispute Resolu­
tion as a Catalyst for Economic Integration and, an Agent for Deepening Integra­twn: NAFIA and MERCOSUR ?, 17  Nw. J .  lNT L L.  & Bus. 8 50 ( 1996-97) . 
71 For a review of the most recent literature assessing the impact of indi­vidual litigants and EU law, see Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter ,Revisit­
ing the European Court of justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 1 77 (1998) . 
72 See Weiler, supra note 3 ,  at 242 1 (notin� importance of citizens to the 
EU judicial system) ; P .P .  Craig, supra note 46 ( 1992) (arguing that private en­
forcement agents are critical to the EU system of direct effect) . See generally 
Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in Interna­
tional judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J .  INT'L L. 61 1 (1994) (calling for greater ac­
ceptance of nongovernmental organizations acting as amici curiae by interna-
• 1 ) uona1 courts . 
., 
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complyin2" with the numerous laws set out under the EU-a kind 
of wi l l i ng 
0
collusion to ignore the law.73 
'X'hile an oversight body is more likely to bring cases, it also 
has the problem of measuring the value of a vast number of cases 
and keeping straightening out its own political agenda. In addi­
t ion , an oversight body p robably will not have sufficient re­
sources to check compliance with all laws nor to bring all the 
cases of noncompl iance to the court .  Private actors, on the other 
hand, do not have the political baggage of b ri nging a ca5:e against 
another state.  P rivate actors can make a d irect econ orn ic assess­
ment about whethe r it is worth it to them to spend the t ime and 
l . . . Wh . 1 . , ' m.oney on 1t1gat10n .  • ere pnvate actors are grant ee. ngnts and 
wher-e the benefits of the treaty are supposed to accn . .t e  directly to 
private actors, it makes sense to give private actors a remedy for - . 1 . f h . h 74 v1o aoon o t ose ng1 ts.  
3.3.  Supremacy over Domestic Law 
3.3. 1. Definition 
A crucial factor  i n  examining the rights of private actors is the 
extent to which the system creates binding law for the member 
states. Supremacy can be clearly defined for international law-be 
it treaty or decision from the dispute resolution t ribunal-to be 
supreme to domestic law. Yet states vary widely on their use, 
adoption, and interpretation of i nternational law. 
73 See Carlos A.  Ball, The Making of a Transnational Capitalist Society: The 
Court of Justice, Soci.al Policy, and Individual R ights Under the European Com­
munities Legal Order, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307 (1996) .  
74 This avenue provided the court with the opportunity to decide some of 
the most important cases in the judicial history of the ECJ .  Furthermore, the 
ECJ hears more cases as preliminary references under Article 177 than directly. 
In the early years of the EEC, from 1958 to 1 973, nearly two-thirds of all cases 
in front of the ECJ came through preliminary rulings. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, 
Legal Systems of Regional Economic Integration, 22 AM. J. COMP. L. 4 1 5, 426 
(197 4) (citing to Commission's Annual General Report on the Activities of the 
Communities) . This use of Article 1 77 references continues to increase. In 
1993, the ECJ received 203 references which more than doubled the number of 
cases in 1 980. See Sarah E.  Strasser, Evolution & Effort: The Development of a 
Strategy of Docket Control for the European Court of justice & the Question of Pre­
liminary References (Harvard Law School Harvard Jean Monnet Chair Working 
Papers, No . 3/95) , available at ;,onathan Katchen, The Jean Monnet Chair 
(visited Apr. 4, 1 998) < http:! www. law.harvard.edu/Programs/Jean Man­
net/ > . 
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3. 3. 2. 
T I P. j I , ,  r: L u .  a . . n t  • _.__con. . 
Treaties Equal with National Law 
[Vol 19 :2  
Some states, including the United States, t reat international 
neat i es as equal to national law. For example, the U . S .  Constitu­
tion states that treaties are the supreme la� of the land . 75 Under 
rules of interpretation, this means that a later law trumps the bv.l 
, · h � . . 76 Th S C""' h h j • ·v;n1c, precec.ed 1t .  , e upreme ,ourt ,as t us statea thar , 
By the Constitution a treaty is placed on the same foot ing,  
.- -. •  -i �� �d"' [ ., . 1 "' 1 l ' a  � · .. . ; t '  . ,. J 1 Po- ;  - 1  _ ;  ,... .J. u ·..l l d d  .... 01 1 l K·� 0 0  lbaL!on, vv . e n  an ac. O.t 1 - ::: · s ,auou . . . .  
\:X/hen che two relate to the same subject , the courts will  
always endeavor to construe them so a s  to give effect to 
' l . ,  1 1 ' • l 
' 1 . h ' r o o t n ,  1t tnat can oe done wn ·1 out vw atmg t ,e L::ngu8.ge o
-. ; t �  a r �  b : ; .c  t l  t re . . te t t h Q n P  1 --� =-r ; .... L .. , t o  e .  rl "' L , u .  1 1 _ n e  wo a. 1nconsrs n , 11e L- · " "' '· . n  uo __ _ ,_ 
'Nill control the other,  provided always t he stipulation of 
the treaty on the subject is self-executing.77 
In practice, a nat ional law could overrule an int·ernational treaty 
d� h '  � 0 0 1 1 78 b . ' 1 '  1 ° un er t 1s treatment ot mternat10na aw, ut 1t st1 i p aces m-
ternational treaties above state law .79 
7" See U.S .  CONST. art . VI, cl. 2. ("This Constitution, and the La·ws of the 
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treat ies made, 
or which shali be made, under the Authority of the United Stares, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . . .  " )  This interpretation o f  treaties is  similar to the 
one in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries in which 
courts have found international treaties to be equal to nationai iaw. In these 
countries, how:ever,_ separate implementing legislation b�yon� . r�lifi�ation is needed to prov1de d1rect effect under these treatles. In real ity, th 1s 1US been the 
case in the United States in more recent treaty implementation where treaties 
are not given direct effect unless expressly provided for in separate implement� 
ing legislation. See discussion supra Section 3 . 1 .  
76 See C.H. McLaughlin,  The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United States, 
42 MINN. L. REV. 709 , 751  (1958) ("[T]he courts have consistently held that 
treaties and statutes are mentioned in terms of equal dignity in the supremacy 
clause, and therefore in the event of a conflict between them whichever is later 
in time must prevail . ") .  Cf United States v. Palestine Liberation Org. , 695 F.  
Supp. 1 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that a subsequent statute would only su­
persede a treaty if that were the explicit purpose of the statute) . 
77 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1 888) .  
78 See, e.g., Ronald A .  Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L.  479 (1990) 
(analJ'"zing GATT) . 
7 The Supreme Court has declared that legislation enacted by the federal 
government in order to implement the objectives of a treaty agreement will be 
superior to any legislation enacted by the states. See Missouri v .  Holland, 252 
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3.3.3. Treaties Supreme to National Law 
Another approach to international law is that it is supreme to  
domestic lav1. Therefore, no nati onal law, no matter when it i s  
passed, ever trumps ·J. n  international law. Examples of countries 
that follow this approach include Belgium, France, and Holland. 80 
A n1odification of th is  approach is that international law is su-
" , , 1 • • 1 · • r i preme co al l taw except ror tne constltutwn or oasrc iaw o·, tne 
r- t· -:1 : r .,. � ..,  '""'� '"' : "\ ,...=... P. .... .,... , ,.., T d T 'A ,  8 1  s L a L e ,  ,.s 1 "  d .t e Ca.:>e _:,, , ··,J '-" d1,.n) an . �t�ly. 
3. 3. 4. DijJen:nce Bet'wee-r?. International Treaties and 
International Decisions 
As the U.S .  Constitution discusses onlv those treaties con-
1 d d' j " . 1 TT d 82 . . 1 ft' 1 • 1 .  • em e ·· u nue r  n rt 1 c 1 e  L proce ures , 1t 1s e � to tne JUdiCiary u n -
US. 4 1 6  ( 1920) (holding_ that a treaty with \anada r.egul_ating the hunti,ng of mwratory bmfs 1s constttutwnal and any feaeral legtslatton therem wd1 pre­
em?t state law) . The Supreme Court furthered this notion by stating that a 
selr-executing treaty will preempt state law, even with no federal legislation. See 
United States v. Michigan, 47 1 F .  Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (reaffirmino- the 
superiority of treaties to state law governing Native American fishinr; rights) . For more information on state law preemption see generally, Harold Maier, 
Preemption of State Law: A Recommended Analysis, 83 AM. J .  INT'L L. 832 
(1989) .  
80 In Belgium, France, and the Netherlands, the constitution or courts have accorded selt-executing treaties supremacy over prior or subsequent domestic 
legislation . See CaNST. art . 55 (Fr.) ; STATUUT NED. [Constitution], art . 94 
(l'Jeth .) .  
8 1  Article 25 of the Basic Law of Germany seems to grant both direct effect 
and supremacy to international law: "The general mles of public international 
law shall be an integral part of the federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and shall d1rectly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the fed­
eral territory." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG], art. 25 . In practice, the 
German Constitutional Court has retained its ability to review mternational 
law, including legislation of the EU and mlings of the ECJ ,  to ensure its com­
pliance with the Basic Law of Germany (the German Constitution) .  See 
BVerfGE 89, 1 55  (the Maastricht Decision) ;  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 
mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel ("Solange I") , 
BVerfGE 37, 271 ,  translated in [ 1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 540; In re Wunsche Han­
delsgesellschaft ("Solange II") , BVerfGE 73, 339, translated in [ 1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 
225; Dieter Grimm, The European Court of justice and National Courts: The 
German Constitutional Perspective After the Maastricht Decision,  3 COLillv1 J .  
EUR. L .  229 (1997) . Both Germany and Italy required separate constitutional 
provisions to accept the supremacy of EU law. See Matth & Slaughter, supra 
note 7 1 ,  at 203 . 
82 U.S. CONST. ,  art. II, § 2 ,  cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .  ") . 
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der U.S .  law whether decisions of international tribunals are to be 
t reated the same way. This problem exists in other states as well.. 
Even those states that find international treaties supreme to their 
national law have not necessarily treated international decisions 
the same way. While national constitutions may have envisioned 
internat ional t reat ies and nude provisions for their supn::rn2.cy, 
few constitutions make provisions for decisions of international 
tribunals. This can be a tt ributed to two reasons.  First, when 
' d ft ' 1 . . . . . 1 ' . . rnost state s ra ed t n e 1 r  constltutwns, 1nternat10na.t ctensw.n-
1 . b d'  d '  ' . r � . h r • . . 'I rna,�Jng o 1es · 1d not ex1st . .)econ ..... , 1n t_ ,e case or arbltr;.;n �::;n r..:e-. . h 1 . .. . • ,-1 .[ 1 ' C1s10ns, t e aronrator gen e npy prov1ues ror carnages anc. "J. o t  :.o.. 
h · 1 • • 1 S3 -rt · I ' c ange m tne domest1c 1aws .  1 ,1e 1ssue 01 sup rernacy ao�s n.oc 
really arise because there is no new law created. Thereforej  ·we 
must examine ·what provis ion s  the international trade ·crr::aty has 
d d .  .J h 1 1 • . rna e regar mg supremacy a nu 10w tne memoer states h:rv.:: .l.E-
terpreted and acted upon this treaty. Only the EU has evolved to 
the p oint where ECJ decisions are supreme over national lavv in 
all the member states .
84 
3. 3. 5. National judges ' A bility to Overrule National La-w 
One last factor in determining the extent to which interna­
tional tribunal decisions have supremacy is whether or not do­
mestic judges have the power to enact this i nternational law.  Can 
the domestic judge overn1le national law in the face of a conHict­
ing international decision? In some states, only the highest court 
of the land can overrule a law. For instance, the Italian court sys­
tem permits only the Italian Constituti onal Court to address the 
constitutionality of national legislat ion.85 Therefore, lower coun 
83  Neither the ICSID or UNCITRAL rules explicitly deny the panel the 
ability to _proscribe a change in the law. However, the arbitral panels have not diverged from the issuance of  monetary damages as  an award. See, e.
_g
. ,  A meri­
can Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ARB/93/1 ;  Southern Pacific Proper­
ties Ltd. v. A rab Republic of Egypt, ARB/84/3) . 
84 See J,H.H. Weiler & Ulrich Haltern, The A utonomy of the Community 
Legal Onfer-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L .J. 4 1 1  (1996) 
(commenting on the well-established supremacy doctrine of the ECJ and its 
limitations) ; see also Symposium, The Interaction Between National Courts and 
International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J .INT'L L. & PoL'Y (1995-96) .  
85 This system has only been modified regarding EU law, where it was held 
that if the lower Italian courts are not permitted to rule on  the invalidity of an 
inconsistent statute, the integration of Community law in the Member States is 
significamlv hindered. For the progression of Community law in Italy, see 
Costa, 19b4 E.C.R. 585 ;  Amministrazione Delle Finanze Delio Stato, 1978 
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judges are constrained b y  their national rules in t h e  implementa­
tion of internat ional rules . S imilarly, in F ranee and Great B ritain ,  
the tradition of judicial review did not exist and took more time 
• 1 • • • h f EU 1 86 F f . to 1mp ement m hg t o aw. or true supremacy o mter-
national law, all judges at all  levels need the abil ity to evaluate na­
tional law in  the face of conflicting international la<;v. 
" d. .). !-. Transparency 
3. 4. 1 .  Why Transparency is Important  
Transparency in a dispute resolut i o n  systern refer.3 to the clar­
ity and i ntelligibi lity of the procedures of the systern :ts s:..'ell as to 
the outcomes. The level of transparency is important for a num­
ber of  reasons, which could be called the three P ' s :  publicity, 
precedent and predictabil ity. First, when the rules and proce­
dures are clear, parties to the dispute are more likely to use the 
system. Government officials,  as well as lawyers for individual 
clients, wil l  have some comfort level with the dispute resolution 
system and wi l l  have an awareness of how the system works.87 
Second, published decisions of dispute resolution tribunals pro­
vide lessons and possible persuas ive authority for other dispute 
resolution tribunals such as courts or  arbitrations . If a decision is 
published, it can provide persuasive precedent for similar dis­
putes . 8 8  Publicity of decisions also puts pressure on states to 
E.C.R. 629 (holding that Italian National Court must give full  effect to Com­
munity law provisions) . See generally Marta Cartabia, The Italian Constitutional 
Court and the Relationship Between the Italian Legal System and the European 
Community, 1 2  MICH. J. INT'L L.  173 (1 990) (discussing contradictions between 
EU Court rulings and Italian law) ; Antonio La Pe rgo la, Italy and European In­
tegration: A Lawyer's Perspective, 4 IND. lNT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259 (1994) (detailing growing support for EU integration in Italy and Italy's subsequent 
attempt to cope with EU directives which conflict with their national law) . 
86 See, e.g., Mattli & Slaughter, supra note 7 1 ,  at 200-04 (1998) . 
87 This concern with transparency and legitimacy has also manifested itself 
in the EU. See Lod�e, supra note 1 5; Maher, supra note 15 ,  238-40; Weiler, su­
pra note 3, at 242 1  noting importance in the EU j udicial system for citizens to 
act as a decentralize agent for monitoring compliance) . 
88 See, e.g., United Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) , 1951 I .C.J .  1 1 6  (Dec. 18) ; 
North Seas Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. ;  F.R.G. v. Neth.) ,  1969 I .C.J .  3 
(Feb. 20) . For a further discussion on precedent in dispute resolution, seeJOHN 
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF IN­
TERNATIONAL ECONOMICS (1989) ;  ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, 
STRENGTHENING THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM (1988) ; 
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, . h , 1 .  s9 F .  1 1  . . , . . comply w1t1 tne ru mgs . · ma .y, transparem rules anu dec1·· 
sions increase the predictability of the system. Clear rules set 
forth how the system is going to work and create con fider1ce on 
the part of the users of the system. 90 The t ransparency of the sy:;­
tem provides the opportunity for both pract it ioners <wcl academ­
ics to analyze, i rnp�ove, and' comprehe�d this particular intern·a-
. ' d . 1 . E 11 . 1 , ,  twnal 1spute reso utwn system. qua ty 1mport8.nt1y, well.-• 1 . . J' :l . t ' . ' • re;1soned aec1s10ns creat e conde ence 1n the dispute res o l u o o n  
' 1 ,...l d h r • h J 1 ' I boay an._, e �ucate t ,e users ot r he system aL. oui . 10vvT t ne i)Oeiy 
'':! TC' l l d. ·b, 0 ll' l .ehr •·o r t• 1 e  ; n t i� c. -� • r: . rP ,\ . 1 1- }. \- .f\. - ; 1,. .1 ...c. l 1 iH ..... J. \.,..l. \.. ,..,. .. ..._. � 
·cV '' l1 ; f a ' ' ""'r  of t- he syc'c. ;--n ; .., not- J..l ' .nn·r wir l, t J� f"  -·? :-, ; .� , . 1 � � ..L. C . .l U..>�..... ... ,.., J L L . ,.. _  .t .J  . ..._ .._ o. r- �"" ) . •  1� 1 .1  . ,_ . .,. 1-'o,_ ..... � �  ..... -.... . � 0- l  
outcome, predictability allows the pan:ie; ·t·� decide <:<.rheth::r � x  
L · · l [ ' ·  1 • n.rr 1 not to use t rus part1cu ar route 01 dtspute resO .! U t lO G .  "N E<:n S'/S-
. d' bl b 1 rr· - 1 ' . ' terns are not pre 1ca ,e,  orn governm.em: ort1c1a s J.nG p n v·;;d.:e 
la·v.ryers ·i;vill be reluctant to advise governrne n ts ::tnd priv2.te a.ctors 
to  take a chance on a haphazard outcome.  The dearest example 
of this has been ICSID, where the small number of cases over the 
years and the unpredictability in terms of appeals has led rnany 
government and corp orate lawyers to advise their clients agatnst 
h .  f d' 1 . 9 1  t 1 s  route o 1spute reso utwn. 
MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD C::ou;-n (!.996) ;  
Yong K.  Kim, The Begin nings of the Rule of Law m the !nterrzational Trade Sys­
tem Despite U.S. Constitutional Constraints, 17 1vl!CH. J. INT'L L .  967 (1996) .  
89 See ABR.A.M CHA YES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHA':i'ES, THE NEW 
SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH lNTERt\::;.\TION.A.L REGULATORY 
AGREEMENTS 22 (1995) . 
90 See Yair Baranes, The Motivations and the �Models: A Comparison of the ls­
r·"zel- U.S. Free Trade Agreement and the North A merican Free Trade Agreement, 17 
N.Y.L.  SCH. J.  INT'L & COMP. L 145,  156  (1997) (aro-uing that the lack of 
specificity in the Israel-U.S.  Free Trade Agreement is probiematic) . 
9 1  The problem with ICSID is only partial ly a result of the lack of trans­
parency in the decisions. In its 32 year h.tstory, ICSID has only handled about 
45 cases. ICSID lacks the histo7 and case loaci to provide predictability and 
assurance to investors in need o an efficient and effective arbitration facilitY. 
Another _problem with ICSID is that the decision is subject to review by an i�­
ternal rev1ew committee. Any party may request an interpretation, revision, or 
annulment of an award. See ICSID Conventwn § 5, arts. 50-52, supra note 61 .  
The tribunal that rendered the award or, if unavailable or not  practical, a new 
review tribunal shall decide on the reviewable issue. Revisions of an award may 
be provided if new information is discovered within three years of the rendered 
decl.sions. See id. , art. 5 1 .  Article 52 lists five reasons why an award may be an­
nulled: (1) the tribunal was not properly constituted, (2) the t ri bunal mani­
fe�tly excee?ed its powers, (3) a member of the tribunal was corrupted, �4) the 
tnbunal senously departed from the fundamental rule of procedure, a.rJ.d �,s) the 
award fails to state the reasons on which it was based. See i...i . . an . 52 . Althotl':rh 
whether a decision is subject to review is not a factor used to determine the 
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3. 4. 2. Lack of Rules and Procedure J 
The lowest level of t ransparency is  when the rules and proce­
dure do not exist in  advance of the dispute. Resolution is left up 
ro the parties and no system is set forth. This is most typical in 
bilateral treaties , where disputes in compliance or interpretation 
f h . f h . . . 9? o L e treaty are l e .t to t _e states to negot1ate as th;:y a nse.  -
3. 4 . . 3. Decisions/<Agreemerzts Not Published 
\V!h � �h - t· i p - '"" ' �  �-, .)CPd• reS la ,... 10 ·r .... L, Q ... J Fr � " � .(: •8 en L t .  e • U l � :> o. L '-"  1--' rl � u are c '-o.r ' lL '- .t l •. u. ._-.,lSl v fi S  o .. h . , 1 1 b h . 1. t 1  e t n o u nai o r  r: n e  agreement etween t e pan1cs a.�·e not puo-
l ished, this c reates au additional transparency issue . For example, 
� � .D 
' 
. . -i . . 1 1 k c- ' . • . r an IC) l 1  J. r b l t rat w r� �...:eCls!OD can a so oe .ept co nlldentla.l 1t re-
• 1 L . 93 Th ' h h ' rl . .  quested oy t o e parttes.  1s  means L .at t 1s ""eClston cannot 
provide precedent or predictability in the system . because unin­
volved lawyers cannot analyze the panel 's thinking . � 4  In this case, 
type of dispute resolution system, it clearly affects the overall effectiveness of 
any system. In addit ion to further time and expense associated with the deci­
sion, in ICSID's case, it further diminished the predictability of the dispute 
resolution system. See INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 2 1 ST CENTURY: 
TOWARD "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORN1ITY? (Richard Liliich & Charles 
Brower eels.) (1992) ; '"t!. tfi..JCHi\EL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL fN 
lNTERNATlONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDO'XIN AND 
REPAIR 46-106 (1 992) ; Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Set­
tlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct Investment, 26  LAW. 
& PoL'Y INT 'L Bus. 633 (1 995) ;  David A. Soley, JCSID Implementation: An Ef 
fective A lternative to International Conflict, 19  INT'L LAW 52 1 (1 985) .  
92 See example o f  the renegotiation o f  the U.S.-Japanese auto agreement 
discussed infra note 99. 
93 Article 48 (5) of the ICSfD Convention explicitly prohibits the publish­
ing of awards without the consent of the parties. See ICSID Convention, supra 
note 6 1 ,  art. 48(5) . Thus, the transparency of such a system remains questwn­
able. See T ohn B. Attanasio, Rapporteur's Overview and Conclusions of Saver· 
eignty, Globalization, and Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J .  INT'L L .  & POL. (1 996) 
(addressing the factors that make the ICSID less credible than ICJ judgments) . 
See also J.A. Freedberg, The Role of the International Council for Commercial A r­
bitration in Providing Source Material in International Commercial A rbitration, 
23 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO . 272 \1 995) (stating that even though the ICSID Con­vention requires consent to publish, many awards get published) . 
94 The ICSID's lack of case law precedent as well as the review process 
make the arbitral facility less appealing to investors. Difficulty with interfer­
ence by national courts has made ICSID even more unreliable. See Maritime 
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C .  Cir. 
1983) (ICSID, Case No. ARB/84/4) (refusing to enforce the ICSID arbitral 
award) ; Monroe Leigh,judicial Decisions, 8 1  AM. J. INT'L L. 206, 222-25 ( 1987) .  
(detailing AMCO Asia Corp. v .  Republic o f  Indonesia, 2 5  I.L.M. 1439 ,  ICSID 
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parties are able to understand how the system works, but are not 
confident using it. Outsiders either have no idea about the out­
come of the dispute, or, when they do , the lack of an explanation 
for the decision sti l l  leaves gaps in their understanding of how the 
tribunal works. In addition, a body of case law with persuasive 
force is not established, and the rules of the organization remain 
b . d 1 1 b . to e mterprete. on an ad noc as1s .  
3. 4. 4. Decisions A re Published 
�1 he. J-, ' o L e-t 1 pl 0C  � Y':J i) .:-- -:- a'�"'".on r�r 1. $ w he n the  ct' ac · c � n ·ll � ,-...J � h o  1 '· H l t; fl , :, . e v ·- < l L ' � , L.l j-1 l '- L '--) ' _, •" - ,, '- '-- -l .0' lJ L -' -� " i • . J. '--
1 '  ] · • _J 1 1 · 1 d l j T I • 1 dispute reso "ut1on bouy are pu o 1sne regu ar.y. 1.n tms C�l.Se,  cne 
decis ions can be read by_ practit ioners, government offici�cL::. ,  other . . ' d . ·n -- D . . b 1 ' · · · jUrists, and aca em1cs. ec1s1ons can e ana_yzed, exp i amed, 
and used as a basis for other cases.  Only in this way can persua­
sive authority be established. This is also the best way for private 
actors and their lawyers to become comfortable with the dispute 
resolution mechanism. Furthermore, public decisions increase 
the pressure on states to comply. This level of t ransparency cur­
rently exists only in the EU although the WTO h as made prog­
ress towards this goal . 
3. 5. Compliance/Enforcement 
The fifth and final factor i n  determining the value of individ­
ual involvement is the level of enforcement mechanisms provided 
for in the dispute resolution system. Compliance and enforce­
ment are often targeted as the main weakness of the international 
legal system.  96 Because international courts have thus far not had 
(Case No. ARB/8 1/ 1) (1986) ,  where the Indonesian government annulled 
ICSID decision on the grounds that ICSID "manifestly exceeded its powers . ") .  
95 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the World 
Trade Organization and the Evolution of the GA TT Disrute Se�tl�ment System 
Smce 1948, 3 1  COMMON MKT. L REV. 1 1 57, 1 227 (1994 (explammg the neces­
sity of publishing decisions in a timely manner) .  
9 6  John Austin, for example, called international law "public international 
morality" at best because he defined law to require the threat of enforcement, 
while i nternational law is merely enforced by moral obligation rather than di­
rect subjection to a nation's laws. See John Austin, Lectures on ]urisprttdence or 
the Philosoplry of Positive Law (New York, Jane Cockcroft & Co. ,  1 875) ,  val. 1 ,  p. 121 ;  see also LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN 
POLICY (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the effects of international law on how nations 
behave among one another); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN IN­
TRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE (4th ed. 1949) 
(discussing origins and peculiarities of international law) . 
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military forces to enforce their decisions, many critics of  the  in­
ternati onal system focus on th-9se cases where states choose to ig-
h . . 1 9' T1 1 r: 1 nore t e mternatwna cou rt .  ne apparent: use essness m tne 
United States bringing a case against Iran for holding U.S.  hos­
tages and the attempt of the United States to avoid prosecution by 
Nicaragua are o:ften cited as classic examples of what haooens be-.. '-' ..1.. .l 
. . ' " .  · 1  1 h ' . ' f GA ....-·� fore an mternatlonal court .  .)liDl ar y, t 1 e breakdown o .... 1 l 
in the 1980's  as tb; ·:� m ost powerful states ignored GATT panel d . 9;,; ' h . ' 1 . recomrnen auons·  shows t1 e ·weakness ot re1ymg on states to 
1 · 1 _ r t · r ·tvi · 1 comp y ·vnt.hour .,::rreCiT·.re r:: nro rcement measun:'s . v\ 1tnom: argv.-
. ' l . . 1 1 '  1 . ' wg w.ne tner rnt: :T1;;::t't:i0na.t mspute reson.ruon can ever truJ.y 1 ,. . . . 1 , I r .-"wor><:., · '  1t 1s 1mportant to assess t ne leve , or entorcement a court 
can have . 
3. 5. 1. 1\fo FormaL Enforcement of the Treaty R ights 
The first level of enfo rcement of treaties is where there is 
nothing specific written into the treaty or dispute resolution sys­
tem. Enforcement under this system of dispute resolution is 
clearly left to the respective states . There is no oversight institu­
tion. Any noncompl iance would put the parties back at the nego­
tiation table in order to work out this dispute as well. In other 
words, a negotiation system which relies on first-order compli-
97 Louis Henkin says «almost all nations observe almost a!! principles of in­
ternational law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time. " 
HENKIN, supra note 96,  at 47.  But, skeptics point to plenty of contrary evi­
dence such as the Iran-United States or United States-Nicara9ua cases before the ICJ. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tenran, (U.S. v. Iran) 
1981  I .C.J. 45 (May 12) ;  Military and Paramilitary Activities, (Nic. v. U.S .) 1986 
I.C .J .  14  Qune 27) . 
98 GATT procedure provided the losing parties with successful means of 
delaying the appointments of panels, effectively blocking adoption of the panel 
reports, and merely ignoring panel decisions. For instance, after the U.S.  as­
serted a complaint in 1981  under GATT against the EC concerning pasta ex­
port subsidies, the EC effectively blocked adoption of the panel report in favor 
of the United States. The United States resorted to indirect retahation efforts 
which sparked countermeasures by the EC. See ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1 5 1 -54 (1993) (citing Subsidies on Exports of 
Pasta Products, SCM/43, May 19 ,  1983 ,  an unadopted decision, and other cases 
detailing GATT's ineffectiveness) ; see also Petersmann, supra note 95, at 1203-04 
(enumerating some further problem areas of the GATT dispute settlement sys­
tem) . 
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ance requires following the agreement at all  times. States either 
follow the agreement, o r  they must negotiate a new one.99 
3. 5. 2. Second-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring the 
Treaty 
Second-order compliance occurs '.vhen a dispute resolution 
mechanism exists under the t reaty which would rule o n  compli-
""'l �  r :::. l- -,: 1-h - bp- --·r -"' r ..-)c- .,.,., .  , . .... , � , ,. ..,.  P :.  · - i- n  ffiPClf, . n · ... � 1 u  .... ,.n ... t:. oy ��.e mem � '  c. L ,, L '- -· · w u n o .._, L  a .::>tpara.-� , .... . J. • •  l.Jrn, Il..lk.J 
r ] '  . ' ·: 1 f ' 1  I : J • . l .. h tor t reaty como.1ance ancl o:-eacn . o l ww the oe ��mlt  CJ. •.e s ot t e �; · • � ·' . 100 . 1 c ' . '· lenna Convention. The ru 1es 0 1  the V1enna Convention, 
however, are veneral iv perceived as insufficient in te rrcs of deal-
. · , 0 1 � u l 1 1 • • • mg wrth treaty breach, · and t nerefo re c reate an wcenuve for m-
99 For example, Japan and the U.S .  have had to renegor iate t heir agreement 
on the auto parts market several t imes .  See U.S. Frustrated by Japan 's Progress on 
Car Sales, Dealerships in A uto TaU�s, 14 Int ' l  Trade Rep. (BNA) 1 759 (Oct . 9 ,  
1 997) ; High Leruel Talks Slated with Japan on  Auto Agreement, supra note 56; 
David Sanger, Trade's Bottom Line: Business over Politics, N.Y.  TllvlES, July 30 , 
1995, at DS.  
100 See Vienr:a Convention on the Laws of Treat ies,  opened for signature 
May 23 ,  1969, U.N. Doc. t\!Conf. 39/27 [hereinafter VIenna Convention]. 
A rt icles 3 1  and 32 of the Vienna Convent ion specifically address issues of t reaty 
interpretat ion.  According to Article 3 1 ,  a treaty shall be interpreted first by 
!ookmg at the text of the treaty itself  in i ight of the object and o umose. Meth­
ods for interpretation shall then recognize the ent ire treaty tak�ng �nto consid­
erat ion subsequent treaties and practices. The negotiation history of the treaty 
will also be taken into consideration.  If the treaty remains ambiguous after 
those considerations, A rticle 32 allows for recognition of the  preparatory 
works for the final method of interpretation.  Subsequent articles deal with the 
conditions under which a party may terminate its obligat ions under the treaty. 
For instance, Article 46 i nvalidates a treaty if it violates an international l aw of 
fundamental p rinciple; Articles 49 through 52 deal with the t ermination of ob­
ligations when a treaty was procured through fraud, corruption, or  coercion;  
Article 61 discharges a party for impossibility of performance; and, A rt icle 62, 
rebus sic stantibus, allows for termmation of a treaty in  which a circumstance 
that was an essential basis for consent fundamentally changes to the extent of 
radicaliy transforming the scope of obligation . As a last resort, a party to a 
treaty may terminate its obligation by breach but must confront the conse­
quences addressed by Article 60. 
101 See Frederic Kirgis, Jr. ,  Some Lingering Questions about A rticle 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 549 (1989) 
(discussing the unresolved issues of b reach) ; John K.  Setear,Responses to Breach 
of a Treaty and Rationalist International Refations Theory: The Rules of Release 
and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 
VA. L. REv. 1 (1997) (explaining that, in addition to A rticle 60, remedies for 
breach of a treaty exist m the form of an uncodified l aw) ; see also SHABT AI 
ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATI' (1985 )  (generalizing breach es of t reaties) . Arti­
cle 60 of the Vienna Convention delineates the consequences for breach of a 
treaty.  In the instance of a material breach i nvolving a bi lateral treaty, the ter-
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ter:national o rganizations to set up more complete mechanisms of 
dispute resolution. 
• r , .• • 1 . � ·  d l . 1 • · b ' A:..ny or the tormal mec.1amsms mscusse nere-·mc.udmg ar 1-
r:ration under ICSID, panels under GATT, the dispute resolution 
system under the '!/TO, and cases under the ECJ--act as second-
' 1 '  I • 'Th' . 1 • 1 order comp 1ance mecnamsms. · ey perrnrt cases :o be brougm 
:: .... .,..., ,_ � ., 1 . � ...  l -. ........ .... . : r- 1- r 1 0 t ty , 1 -- � l� r .... 9- ! 1'-.. "" T'"·r _.._ -- ct' � 't --J.ol  _,�o n ._ol ,l..[; ,L,_i "V::: '0/a •.<  �n..... rea .ru.c::, .  �) v u1 , _  , _,_. \_ J. d.1l L 1e 
ICT o.re exan1ples of cou rt systems that orovide fo r Jinle realistic 
r , ' r � . J. • 1 . 1 02 e.n. ;orcernent oeyona cc:nsure or t,le 1nternat10 r:a.'. co.::n:rnunny. 
"T" ' d I , . 1 I -� .t1es -:: systems stop at sec o n  - -o rcler contpilanct,  'v nere oy states 
• ' • 1 I • . . c • . 1 ' l ' ' ' I should o oey tnc: ! ;, ·;;J , but n tl1ey vw ate tne 1 aw, u·,t:y S !.'iOUlei pay a 
fir�e (or cl--1ai1ge c.he l�r\,v) � 
,-·�, . r h . . L ' 1 \ _ __.. ne 1 m p o nam: ra.ctor to note at t 1s stage 1s ; ; ,:) w  and w nen 
u_s.es are br�ught w the dispute resolution systern . Fen· example, 
· I I� T J  ' (' ' • ' I 1 1 J m. tne ::: . . _ , 'the '� o nlm tsslon acts as an overs1gnt oocy ana. can 
mination or  suspension of obligations may be instituted by rh� nonbreaching 
party . With a multilateral treaty, all nonbreaching parties must consent to the 
termination or suspension of the treaty in whole or in part . Specifically, the affected party may suspend its obligatwns with the breaching party, or if the 
material breach radicafly changes the scope of the treaty any nonbreaching 
party may invoke suspension or termination of the treaty . See Vienna Conven­
tion, supra note 100, art. 60 . 
'0' . ' h "" �T . . d f 1 · . . h ,.-, - . d  f · - Altrwug. •0A 1 provide or reta 1at1on and L e  I�._..J prcvJ• es or en-
forcement under the Security Council, neither of these remedies were real pos­
sibilit ies for enforcement. The Security Council has never authorized military 
action nor economic sanctions for noncompliance with an ICJ decision. See 
Mark Jan is, Somber R eflections on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the !ntemational 
Coun, in Appra isals of the !Cj's Decision: Nicaragua v. United States (Merits), 8 i 
AM . J. INT'L L. 1 44 ,  145 n. 1 6- 17  (Harold G. Maier ed. ,  1987) (stat�ng that al­
though the U.N.  Charter authorizes the Security Council to enforce decisions 
of the ICJ, no action has ever been taken) . Retaliation authorized under GATT 
was only used once by the Netherlands against the United States . See ROBERT 
E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 198  
(1990) .  However, the  enforcement of decisions in internat ional law through 
voluntary compliance in the face of international pressure should not be under­
estimated. Many countries regularly abide by unfavorable rulings in order to 
remain a l aw abiding member of the international community. See CHA YES & 
CHAYES, sttpra note 89,  at 28 .  Furthermore, direct foreign aid, foreign invest­
ment , and World Bank projects are often l inked to compliance under interna­
tional iaw. For example, the World Bank has played a major role in the com­
pliance of environmental laws in Mexico . See Mexico's Environmental 
Controls for New Companies, 2 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 15 (1992) ; David Bar­
rans, Promoting International Environmental Protections through Foreign Debt 
Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65 (199 1) . But see Stephanie 
Guyett ,  Environment and Lending: Lessons of the World Bank, Hope for the Euro· 
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
889 (1992) (criticizing the shortcomings of such an enforcement mechanism) . 
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bring cases of noncompliance to the ECJ.  103 Other organizations 
do not p rovide standing for any oversight body, meanin g  that 
cases will be brought, if at all ,  by other states. Under GATT, 
states could also delay or avoid a case. 104 Under the new WTO 
procedures, the dispute resolution system has become much more 
0 d" . 1" ri 105 JU 1C18.,1Ze-• .  
Third-Order Compliance-Remedies for Ignoring 
Decisions 
Third--order comoliance can be demonsrrated by way of ::!. tn.f­
fic law example.  If �e conceive that fol lowing the traffic laws is 
first-order co-mpliance and paying the traffic ticket when o ne does 
not it is second-orde r compliance, an arrest warrant o r  co nt:empt 
citation fo r  nonpayment of  the traffic t icket would be third-order 
compliance . This is yet another level of forcing one to comply 
with the original laws set forth.  In the  i nternational arena, the 
analo gy would be fol lowing the trade t reaty as complying in the 
first-order, and agreeing to change the tariff in response to a de­
termination that the tariff was unfair would be the second-order 
103 Article 169 of the EEC Treaty gives the Commission the authority to 
enforce community bw compliance for all Member States. The Commission 
will first give the State notice in the form of an opinion letter, detailing the 
method and t imeliness of compliance. If the Member State refuses to comply, 
the Commission can sue the Member State in the ECJ. See Case 7 I 6 1 ,  Com­
mission v. Italy, 1961  E.C.R. 3 17 (forcing Italy to terminate its ban on imported 
pork in compliance with community law) . See Karen Banks, National Enforce­
ment of Community R ights, 2 1  COMMON MKT. L.  REV. 669 (1984) .  Article 170 
gives a Member State the right to sue another Member State for the enforce­
ment of community law. The complaining State must first submit its concern 
with the Commission and allow the Commission to enforce the issue. See Case 
232/78, Commission v .  France, 1979 E.C.R. 2729 (describing Commission ac­
tion on complaints from the United Kingdom) . Although a rare occurrence, if 
specific measures are not taken the complaiemg State can take the infringing 
State directly to the ECJ .  See, e.g., Case 1 4 1 /78 ,  France v .  United Kingdom, 
1979 E.C.R.  2923 . For more on enforcement of these articles, see generallyEn­
Jorcement A ctions under A rticles 169 and 1 70 EEC, 1 4  EUR. L .  REV. 388  ( 1989) . 
104 See C .  O 'Neal Taylor, The Limits of Economic Power: Section 301 and the 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TR.ANSNAT'L 
209, 236-37 (1997) (discussing the delays brought about by the United States 
when Brazil pursued under GATT complaints about Section 301) ;  see also John 
Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The DISC Case in GA TT, 72 
AM. J .  INT'L L., 747, 779-8 1 (1978) (concluding that the some GATT dispute cases, due to interference from other states, severely injure GATT's prestige) . 
105 See Petersmann, supra note 95; Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The 
]udicialization of International Trade Relations, 1 7  Nw. J. INT'L L. E-c Bus. 775 
(1996-97) . 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/14
1998] DEJv!OCRA CY AND DISPUTE RESOL UTION 62 1 
of compliance. The third-order of compliance would be a system 
by which the affected state,  private actor or even the i nternational 
organization ·would be able to bring noncompliance with the in­
ternational decision back to the dispute resolution system. 
In some situations, this third-order compliance mechanism is 
available. For example, if an international arbitration body 
� . f . . ' awarc.s a cert;;un amount o money to a party that 1s tnen not 
paicL, marry sta.tes n o w  provide that the winner of the arbitral 
�'- -r- ,.) .-, - t_, : _ _  ,_,_ .-. ...... ,.... C ; ; .- o - � �  " 1 " ··- a f c. 1 · ,  1 0"  a vvaru C a.n u r t l J ;::: . .  ,_ l. ct.) e ... n dOiD.'-:::. c.c court LO ,.n ore'- tne J uab-
1 06 · � - · I L' u L . • . � h ment . Anuc b�:- O::X<1 m ple !S tne .L '  , wmch p ro vwes t . • at a state 
' C . . ; - 1 -� r· - . b or tne omnEss J .O n  can bnng a case to t11e _c., ,___,j agamst a mem er 
1 • , - • · 1 ' · • iD7 -� r state tnat has not comp"1ect \Vitn :1 court aec1s ; o n .  · t:nrorceme nt 
1 0 � -r · . 1 ' 1 1 b h ' . . 1 l tmuei:' the C. u iS r:ven more 11.K:e y ecaus,-: t 1e oec1s10ns tnemse ves 
are integrated imo the domestic legal fabric as is done with the re-
r l J • T; " ' 1 os -B h .,.. . C,  1 , 1 ·  terra system. unr..:er t:he _;_.\....j .  _ ecause t e .t. JJ maKes tne ru mg 
106 Signatories of the New York Convention permit individuals and na­
tions access to their courts in order to attach assets of nonpaying parties to an 
arbitration. See Convention of the United Nations on the Recognition and En­
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10 ,  1958 ,  21 U.S .T .  2517 ,  30 
U.N.T.S. 3 8 .  [hereinafter New York Convention]; Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas Co. v. Sociere Generale de L 'Industrie Du Papier ("RAKT A") , 508 
F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974) (enforcing an award on the basis of the New York 
Convention) . Article V of the New York Convention recognizes only seven 
circumstances in which a signatory state may refuse enforcement and, thus, this 
treaty has been credited wnh drastically stren_pthening the appeal of interna­tional arbitration. See Susan Choi, Judicial En;orcement of A rbitration A wards 
Under /CSID and the Neu' York Convention, 28 N.Y.U. J .  INT'L L.  & POL. 175 
(1995) ;  Eric Green , In ternational Com mercial D�s ute Resolution, 1 5  B .U. INT'L 
L.J. 1 75, 177 (1997) ; Elise P. Wheeless, A rticle V /1) (B) of the New York Conven­
tion, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 805 (1993) . In a ctition to the New York Con­
vention other treaties exist for the purpose of enforcement of arbitral awards 
such as the Panama Convention, the Washington Convention, and the Euro­
pean Convention. See Inter-American Convention on International Commer­
cial Arbitration of 1975, entered into force June 16 ,  1 976, 14 I .L.M. 336; Wash­
ington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 1 8 ,  1 965, 4 I.L.M. 532; European Commu­
nities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,  8 I .L.M. 229. 
107 See, e.z., Case 1 69/87, Commission v. France, 1988 E .C.R. 4093 (forcing 
the Commisswn to bring France in front of the ECJ for the second tlme for 
noncompliance with an earlier court ruling on tobacco pricing) ; Case 48/71 ,  
Commission v .  Italy, 1972 E.C.R. 527 (allowing a claim against Italian govern­
ment for failure to levy an EU t<Lx) ; Case 1 3 1/84, Commission v. Italy 1985  
E.C.R. 353 1  (allowing action against Italy for failure to enforce the"Collective 
Redundancies") ; Case 69/86, Commission v. Italy, 1987 E.C.R. 773 (enforcing a 
previous judgment against Italy for the quality control of produce) . 
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on the law alone, the domestic court then renders the final deci­
sion applying the EU law to the facts at hand. S ince the decision 
is from a domestic court,  not an international court ,  many com­
mentators believe that states are far less likely to  ignore the deci­
sions. 109 Each additional o rder of compliance means that private 
actors have increased ability to force states to comply with the 
treaty. 
3. 5. 4. 7) . h +-1 un zs, menc 
A final component of '.::n forcement is the type of  plmishmem: 
permitted under the treaty and d ispute resolution system. Re­
tal iation apart from an internat ional treaty is 2:e nenllv seen as a 
. l . f . . 1 1 1 10 'T' u d -. . . vw atwn oL mternat1ona1  1a1.v . 1 reaty-approve retallatwn j  on 
the other hand, can p rovide an effective enforcement mechan ism. 
This approved retali;tion does not constitute a breach o r  termina­
tion of the treaty but rather an app ropriate means of punishment 
for the treaty violation. The retaliation can be carried out by the 
state against which the harm has been committed or even by 
other states. 
For example, the WTO outlines stringent enforcement meas-. 
f . d . f f . 1 1 1 ures m terms o prov1 mg a menu O� en orcement optwns. 
1os F . f . h . . d or more m ormatiOn on t IS process see Attanasw, supra note 93 ,  an 
Lenore Jones, Opinions of the Court oj the EU in National Cou rts, 28 N.Y.U. J .  
INT'L L .  & POL. 275 (1996) . 109 See generally Symposium, supra note 84 ,  (portraying several views con­
cerning the problems and inconsistencies between natwnal and international 
bodies) . 
1 1 0  See ]AGDISH BHAGWATI ET AL . ,  AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM (1990) 
(describing various opinions on the debate over U.S . trade sanctions and the 
GATT .) ; see also Clay Hawes, The Pe!Ly A mendmenc San ctions, 3 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 97 (1994) (debating whether sanctions imposed on Norwegian 
goods for violation of the Fisherman's Protect ive Act, 22 U.S .C .  § 1978 (1994) 
IS a violation of international law) ; Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Fu­
ture of Section 301, 34 COLUM. J .  TRANS. NAT'L L. 173 (1995) (evaluating sanc­
tions in the area of intellectual property) ; Lopez, supra note 65 (discussing the 
controversy of the Helms-Burton Act as a potential violation of NAFTA) . 
1 1 1  Under the WTO, if a party does not comply with a decision within the 
specified time period, the party must start negotiations for mutually accepted 
compensation. If no compensation is agreed upon after twenty days, the com­
plainant, under Article 22, can request authonzation from the Dispute Settle­
ment Body ("DSB") to retaliate. The DSB consists of one representative from 
each member of the agreement in dispute and has the authority to administer 
rules and procedures, adopt reports (rom panels, maintain surveillance of im­
plementation, and authorize suspension of concessions. Unless there is a con­
sensus against retaliation, the DSB must grant authorization within 30 days. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/14
1998]  DEikfOCZA CYA ND DISPUTE RESOL UTION 623 
First , a state has the opportunity to fol low the ruling and, usually , 
chano-e the offending practice. Second, the state can continue the t? � J.. 1 . 1 1  I · 1 pract1ce and pay damages to tne harmed sene. � - If ne�tner of 
these options are taken , the harmed state can retaliate. 1 d The 
\VTO provides that the harmed state must firsr retaliate in the 
same se-ctor of trade. However, if this is not seen as effective, the · 1 ·  . 1 1 4 T1 . ,- " h \vTO Derrruts cross-sector reta 1at10n. - ms newer rorm ot L e l. 
• • 1 ,
. d"  . 1 l. h . rl mternatwnat aC J U  lCatlon nas more teet:1 1  t 1en 1ts p reu.ecessors 
..-J ,.. , , ..... '(...... . r ..... �,- - / ::l. ...- t� h � b1 .o r· .. " :;- .- +· t" l  D r .... : r  1 1 5 anu ,,t L �- !.Yl D c� , o  c o r  r--et so,ne o t e D" o 1 ·- t i • ->  lh ·. LL. �h"-->L .i .1_ l. 
Retalia: ioa will first be Iaken in the same sector  as the ,- [obtio n .  If, however, 
such re:al iatlo n i.s not practical or effective, ac( ion  \vil l  be taken in  another sec­
tar in che sam.e gen-::ral area . If t his sti l l  groves ineffect ive o r  impractical , action 
will be taken as a suspension of  bene1 1ts under the related Uruouay Round 
A(7reement . The determination as to whether retal iation is p ract ical or  effect ive 
wJl be made by the c_omplaining . P?.rt Y rather th ;;n the  \.VTO panel or the de­
fendlDg party. See Thomas J. D1ll10n, Jr. , The World Trade Organzzatwn: A 
Ne'W Legal Order for World Trade, 1 6  MICH . J .  INT ' L  L. 349 (1995) (discussing 
the effectiveness of the WTO with a compariso n of the lack of enforcement 
under compl i ance mechanisms of  the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") or 
the \'Y'orld Bank) ; Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settle­
ment Report: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO R ule Compliance, 1 1  
ST. JOHN'S J .  LEGAL COMMENT 307 (1996) . 
1 1 2 Under Article 2 1  of the Disp ute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") , if 
the party does not,  within thirty days, state intentions for implementing rec­
ommendations of the adopted panel report and set a t ime penod for comoli­
ance, the parties must commence negotiations fo r mutual ly  accepted compe�sa­
tion. See, e. o. , John Mag(7s, US May Buck Tide, Take on the �vTO, J. COM. 1 
(1998) (detaifing that in the face of a recent WTO preliminary report that the 
U.S.  embar(7o on shrimp imports, designed to protect sea turtles, was i l legal ,  
speculation has begun that the U oited States would prefer to  pay compensat10n 
or accept sanctions rather than change the law) . 
1 1 3  Article 22 of the DSU allows the complaining party to request authori­
zation from the DSB to retaliate. The DSB must grant authorization within 
thirty days unless t here is a consensus against such retaliation. 
1 1 4  Article 22 of the DSU permits cross-sector retaliation i f  the previous 
retaliation, within the sector, is not deemed pract ical or effective . Tli.e deter­
mination of whether retaliation is "practical" or "effective" will  be made by the 
complaining party, rather t han the DSU. However, paragraph four l imits the 
retaliation a government can impose to  the equivalent of  benefits t hat t he de­
fending country was impairing. See also 19 U.S. C. § 24 1 1  (a) (3) (1 994) (imposing 
the same l imitations) . 
1 1 5  See Paul Demaret, The Metamorphoses of the GA IT: From the Havana 
Charter to the World Trade Organization, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 23 
(1995) ; Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GA TTIWTO Decision Makino, 
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 653 (1997) ; Patrick Moore,  The Decisions Bringing the 
GA TT 1947 and the WTO A greement, 90 AM. J .  INT'L L. 3 1 7  (1996) ;  Curtis 
Reitz, Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA. ]. 
lNT'L ECON. L. 555 (1996) .  
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Another type of enforcement is a fine levied against the mem­
ber state for <J. violation of the treaty. This fine could be paid to 
the international organization, the affected state or the private ac­
tor who is directly harmed. Under traditional i nternational la·0,r , 
.. . ' 1 . f h t o nce a state took uo a pnvate actor s c a1m o 1arm , tne money Io ' . ' 1 ' l 1 1 16 . . . . oe pard wou d go to tne state.  A more recent mnovat t o n  1 ::1  m-. 1 '  . ' . I I b d "  1 , .  " ' . , . ternatwna law 1s the 1c.ea tnat states can e t rect y 1 1ab1e  t o  E"ldl-
viciu;lls for the harm they have suffered. This is the c;:;s:: '-lnder 
I��} I2--�]ll. 
,._, � , :'' • � 1 • • • r· 1 1 • l tus "i:ype ·OI pumshment directly rectmes tne harm ·�::y 
-� 1""\ ..:..:. n 0 n e n m r) 't : ., y-) ... " !::0 .......-:, ; �- :(. �- h r-:.  1. n t e r n ac ·; o ·--o a l 1law ., ;--- • �l '] 1 c -\ �-· f l "i- •· .�. L H •- . 1 '  L ·- 1..- l i i-' J. l <:<.L t'-'- ·r · � - l  . _ _  , _, .  _ _  . . . 1 L >  .l J. :u \ U "" · ·" -' > ' e •.-) '·'· 
r1 ,-.o <r .-.. rr ,� - -n r  r' ("\ ' . 1 ; ?. �a Th T"CT  ::l �t j " l r  ""' 1 .-, ,. r-.r t- 1 .--- · ,..... ,.., 'I ,�..;..-\) .  • '-- '- L a.;;:.. U l l  uOn� � rn p H ... nc.. .  .. e .1:: J ··'-- s , l r-, e "· C;u .cn, .. > L ·.- '·-VL l L � .  • (,.; • t - 1 • 1 . l • � ' 7 •· • nr-� 1� a••ra�.r!s cJ ··· r- ·· a <•<" d ' "Prt' y to ags:rrteVeQ P '" ' ' ' ;:( i "- 'V'i' (', � �  · '  .:> . •. - ..._. ,_ L c: ·l'i � l l..--. ....... a. ... 1 1 a 0\.....J 11 \..- ...... .... 1 ..  0 , r' L .L V t - .... c: ._._ ._, _. _ _!_ ,_:) , 
The povver to award darnages may alter a nat ional go v,:::rnrnent's  
decision wherher to con1ply with an internat ional law sines .it 
puts a price tag on noncompliance. The costs of noncompliance 
�an be severe and direct . 1 1 8  The EU has gone even funher since 
1 1 6 See RICHARD B .  LILLICH & BURNS H. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL 
CLAiMS: THE!R SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENTS 45 (1975) . The prob­
lem arising with enforcing claims in this manner is a concern of timeliness: The 
claims are only settled years after the harm was done and, thus,  the settlement 
is often not an effective reso lut ion .  See Brice M. Clagett, Title I !I of the Helms­
Burton A ct is Consistent with lntemationaf Law, 90 AM . J .  INT'LL 434,  436, 440 
n . 1 5  (1996) (discussing the ineffectiveness of settlements in the 1980's between 
the U.S .  and China for less than 40% of the claim and in 1 992 between the U.S. 
and Germany for around 6% of the claim) .  
1 1 7 See Case 14/83 ,  Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-'Yiestfalen, 
1984 E.C.R. 1 89 1  (allowing individual workers to enforce t heir rights under a 
Community Directive on equal employment) ; Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz 
eG v .  Landwirtschafts-Kammer Fi.ir Das Saarland, 1976 E .C .R. 1 989 (fo rcing 
Germany officials to refund illegal money charged to individuals for the inspec­
tion of imported apples even though the German st?.tute of frauds had run on 
the claim) . For more on this asrect of the ECJ's damages awards see David 
O'Keefe, supra note 48 ,  and Apri Phillippa Tash , Remedies for European Com· 
munity Law Claims in Member State Courts: Toward a European Standard, 3 1  
COLUM. J .  TRANSNAT'L L .  377 ( 1993) . 
1 1 8  See Case C-27 1 /9 1 ,  Marshall v. Southampton and S . -W. Hampshire 
Area Health Auth. ,  1 993 E.C.R. I-4367 (imposing damages that exceeded the 
United Kingdom's statutory limitations) ; Case C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. 
Italy, [ 1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993) (Italy) . (forcing Italy to �om�ensa_te wor�ers for damases suffered by nommplementatwn of a commumty am:cnve dealing with worKer's protectiOn against bankrupt employers) ; Case 70/72 Commis­
sion v. Germany, 1973 E.C.R.  8 1 3  (forcing Germany to not o nly cease the ille­
gal payments of state aid, but also ,  recover any aid already granted to its nation­
als) . Remarkably, the ECJ has not imposed any fine thus far in a case brought 
by the Commission. Article 17 1  specifiCally states that the ECJ may, by the re­
quest of the Commission, impose a lump sum or penalty payments upon a 
l 
l 1 
1 
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1 9 9 1  and found that member states can be liable to private actors 
for damages suffered through the nonimplement;tion of EU 1 19 I . h f"• 1 1 "  . . I laws. Anc, m some ways, t ese mes ma1\.e comp 1 ance m me 
first place easier since a government can demonstrate how n o n­
compliance wil l  directly hurt the national treasury.  A potentially 
large damage award helps the  governments protec�.: themselves 
agains<: strong dornes tic l obbies as well .  
1 I d "  
. ' "F 1 - dd" . 1 . T nese oamage reme 1es 1n the - �  J are a'- ltlOTial  t o  a f'';qurn>-
ment to change the law, unlike in the WTO system which gra ncs 
choice. By replacing the tradirional international h •;v  rernecly of 
, .  . d . 1 d . rel:ai lJ.<:Wrt ,  a .amages system IS coser to a o:mes uc court sys,:ern . 
. 1 . f . . l l  d , . ,  ' . ' . V 1 o ,au ons o 1nternat 1 0 n a  a·w are create� llKe anv or:ner VlO l 8.o o n  • . > 
f j r j , � P ,  0. 1 " • r• - • Y ' 1 : t"l .  • � �- 1 � Y  T ;; ; r-J ,_  � ... ,..._ � ,  ·· : ,, . .-, O L  J:n e  d V>' . .l)y �.- l l lTi l f!at tng reta.u a t l o n ,  c tle  L {...J <tVO .·.U::> c.. SC-:n d C l v u  
between states retaliating and cross-retaliating. It also avoids l ink.-
' d · fr d . h 1 1 • . age oetween 1 erent tra e Issues ; eac pro o1em 1s t reated sepa-
rately and judged on its own merits .  An enforcement system 
with damages to private actors clearly protects private actors the 
most of the trade systems established. 
4. INCREASING INDIVIDUAL PARTICIPATION INCREASES 
DEMOCRACY 
The purpose of this Article has been to outline the facto rs that 
measure individual participation in dispute resolution and com-
Member State that refuses compliance. This Article was added to the Treaty at 
the request of Parliament concerned with the enforcement of Community iaw. 
Anicie 17 1  ( 1) , stating that necessary measures shall be taken for enforcement of 
compliance, has been used by the ECJ. See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The 
Enforcement ofEU Law, 1 8  Hous. J .  INT'L L. 833 ,  898 n.207 (1996) Oisting the 
fifteen cases in violation of Article 1 7 1) .  However, the imposition of a fine, 
under Article 1 7 1 (2) , has yet to be employed. See Kenneth M. Lord, Note, 
Bootstrapping an Environmental Policy from an Economic Convent, 29 CORNELL 
INT'L L.J . 571 ,  606 n .325 (1996) (commenting on the lack of enforcement 
through use of fines) . See also M1chael J. McGuinness, The Protection of Labor 
R ights in North A merica, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 579, 596 11 . 8 1  (1994) (reasoning the lack of enforcement by use of Article 1 7 1) .  
1 1 9 
I11 199 1 ,  the ECJ instituted remarkable advancement for the enforce­
ment of Community law through the preliminary reference ruling in Fran· 
co1Jich v. Italy. See Joined Cases 6/90 & 9/90, Francovich, [ 1990] 1 C.M.L.R. 
66 (1990) ; Rene Valladares, Francovich: Light at the End of the Marshall Tunnel, 3 
U. IvilAMI Y.B.  INT'L L. 1 (1995) . The ruhn� conferred liability upon a Member State to an individual for damages incurred by nonimplementat10n of a direc­
tive. Thus, because Italy failed to implement a directive concerning the cover­
age of employees under insolvent employers, Italy was liable for the damages 
the employees suffered. See Valladares, supra. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
626 U. Pa. J lnt 'l Econ. L. [Vol 19:2 
pare them to the dispute resolution models currently used in in­
ternational trade organizations . By doing so, we can understand 
how each of these factors either adds or detracts from the legiti­
macy of international trade organizations. In the end, we can 
recognize that individual participation has the ability to increase 
democracy in several significant ways. 
4. 1. jwv-licia! Decisionmaking is Lawma,bng 
ThP f: r r c--t· n ; ,.., �� a ; ; h . r- '"' 1-, r ()  .C ; , } ;  : �  1 �--1 r· � -'� ' ' -' S c  -> L eJ:-' 1 1 �  , _cobn,z.ng t . e  ImP'--' rta"'"'� O t  . nd , v , _,u_a. 1-' "' ' -
ticipation i s  c o  recognize the importance i tself o f  dispute resolu­
tion .  Histo rical ly, states handled trade disputes through negotia­
tion and i i tt !e attention was given to other methods for resolving 
them. Ord·v· with the evolution of the El.L and the reo-0ional hu-· 
I . 
man rights systems, has appropriate focus been given to the irn-
c , · 1 · r:z o portance or mspute reso,utwn. 
In focusing on dispute resolution, we are recognizing the evo­
lution of trade organizations that do more than rely on states to 
resolve their disputes. The creation of the Dispute Resolution 
Body under the WTO and the NAFT A system evolving from the 
Canada-U. S .  Free Trade A greement clearly demonstrate that fo­
cus on dispute resolution is warranted. As trade organizations 
continue to evolve, it will be their dispute resolution systems that 
herald this evolution. 
The result of dispute resolution mechanisms is that each of the 
organizations will be creating a body of law in addition to the 
original agreement.  This body of law may have varying levels of 
precedence and supremacy but will  be the area in w hich these or­
ganizations could primarily evolve. Therefore, it is crucial that 
we also focus on ways to ensure this stage of lawmaking is demo­
cratic and legitimate . 
Even when national governments determine that t rade policy 
and agreements should be negotiated in secret or  solely by the ex­
ecutive branch, once the agreement is reached this origi nal deci­
sion should not preclude citizen involvement in the enfo rcement 
12° Karen J. Alter, Who A re the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Govern· 
ments and the European Court of justice, 52 INT'L 0RG. 1 2 1  (1998) ;  Geoffrey 
Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in the EU, 49 I:N!'L ORG. 171  (1995) ;  
Geoffrey Garrett et al . ,  The European Court of justice, National Governments, 
and Legal Integration in the EU, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998) ; Walter Mattli and 
Anne-Marie Slau�hter, Law and Politics in the EU: A Reply to Garrett Union, 49 
INT'L ORG. 1 8 3  (1 995) ; Andrew Moravscik, Negotiating, the Single European Act, 
45 INT'L ORG. 19 (199 1) ;  Weiler, The Transfonnation oj Europe, supra note 3 .  
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stage . Legislating original law and resolving disputes about that 
law are two separate functions . As I noted earlier, the debate over 
the "democracy deficit" in the EU focuses on the first function. 
We should also look to the second function and recognize the im­
portance of dispute resolution. 
4. 2. Individual Involvement Promotes Legitirnacy 
'l , · r  . ' .  ' . , .  l 1ere are several specuc ways m wnrcn grantmg standmg to  
orivate actors can remedy typical conflicts in a national govern­
�nent .  First, giving private actors the right to bring cases, rather 
than requiring them to lobby o r  per_ i t ion the government to take 
action :  eliminates the problem of captu re at the dispute resolution  
, , t I . 1 . . . h . stage . · - OL1erw1se,  on1y states partl.Clpate m t. e process and, 
therefo re , rely on polit ical p ressures to determine whether to pur­
sue violat ions of trade agreements. Understandably, a state will 
n o t  choose to spend its l imited attention and energy on trade 
problems which have little impact on the domestic economy. 
States will weigh the impact on certain industries, the political 
clout of those industries, and pressures fro m  other domestic con­
stituencies before embarking on negotiations . A state m ay not 
even know of any violation until a domestic interest alerts them. 
For example,  if a company in the US feels that another state is 
vio lating the GATT rules, it must petition the USTR under the 
3 0 1  procedure in order to pursue a judicial remedy. The USTR 
must then make a decision as to whether it is worth the time and 
energy to pursue a remedy through the WTO. This procedure 
probably operates very well for the "Kodaks" and "IBMs" of the 
world, but if  the company affected by the violations is  relatively 
smal l ,  lacks political influence or power, or has not suffered large 
losses, the USTR could, legitimately, conclude that out of the 
12 1 Of course, there is always the issue of  adjudicatory capture in which in­
terest groups are able to use the judicial system for their own interests. One 
example in the context of trade dispute resolution could be the EU where pub­
lic interest groups in Great Britam have used the EU in order to advance 
changes in the domestic law. See Catherine Barnard, A European Litigation 
Strategy: The Case of the Eohud Opportunities Commission, in NEW LEGAL 
DYNAMICS OF EU 253 Qo S. aw & Gillian More eds, 1995) ;  see also Matt!i & 
Slaughter, supra note 7 1 ,  at 1 85-190 (1998) . Another example could be  if envi­
ronmental NGO's use NAFTA to force Mexico to comply with its own envi­
ronmental laws. See Atik, supra note 26. 
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numerous trade violations it polices, this particular violation 1 s  
not worth the government's l imited resources. 
1 L ' . b . A government may atso C11oose not w on:ng a ca.se . ecause lt 
does not want the vio lat ion addressed. A stau� could decide not to 
bring a case against a particular state for political reasons in deal­
in!=' with that state or because other domestic interests would o re-o r 
fer to keep the law unchanged.  Furthermore, in.terguvernmental 
pressure .may result in cases not being brough:: to the international 
adjudicatory body. The best example of this is the controversy h T I  1 1 I . 1 . ' . .  ' --, ' 1 over t _e r- e ms-Bunon aw, wrucn restnccs uacte vnt h  l__,lJ.i:n ano 
· \... h 1 · 1 i I �2 7' ' 1., T T · · · • 1 pums11es t1 ose w no engage m s�cn t rac. e . }. ne c u 1 mtlalq 
l l l l . . h \ 'Vf'<'t• l . ' • l '  o c  gee a. comp a1nt Wl't.t t ,1e 'v\ 1 '-\ wnJ cr� h::.::: re!_:-;eatec..ly post-
d 1 · 1 1  l � 'f T d L -· " · ' c . · pone tne 1ssue to a . ow tne t, u an tue \) rur:ed .)t a ·c e s nm.e to ne-
gotiate. There is no doubt that domescir.: pressure in the United 
States has led to the United States olacirw: o ressure o n  rhe EU not 1 \_.' -
to pursue the case. In this way, the WTO has become politicized. 
Rather than adjudicating appropriate restrictions on uade, the fo­
rum is hijacked by the domestic pressure and politics of U.S.  pol­
icy towards Cuba. If there were private actor standing in the 
WTO, this case would already be in the process of being heard. 
Furthermore, givin g  private actors standing may be the best 
method of ensuring t hat their own state actually follows the trade 
m F  1 1 h · ·  agreement. or examp1e, unaer t .e cu rrent system, It !S un-
likely that the United States or any other state ·would agree to 
bring a case against itself in the WTO. One only has to examine 
the jurisprudence of the ECJ to recognize t hat the right to b ring 
cases in the EU has resulted, as often as n o t ,  in  private actors su­
ing their own government for violations of EU law . 124 This en­
sures that a commitment to trade liberalization is not later over­
ridden by specific exceptions or changes to the law agreed to by 
122 For an explanation of the Helms-Burton Act, its domestic and interna­
tional effect, and foreign responses, see Symposium, 20 7he Helms-Burton Act: 
Domestic Initiatives and Foreign Responses, HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L .  REV. 
713-8 14  (1997) . 
123 See Robert Cover, 7he Uses of jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideol­
ogy, and Innovation, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS 
OF ROBERT COVER 51 -93 (Martha Minow et al. eels . ,  1992) (arguing that juris­
dictional redundancy, as extsts between the federal and state system in the U.S. 
and also between the domestic systems and the EU, can effectively deal with 
the problems of the elite in a political system and is an appropriate method of 
dealmg with conflicting values 1n a society.) -
P4 � d '  . . � 2 4 - :':>ee 1scuss10n supra sectiOn -' ·  . .  
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lawmakers under pressure from powerful and narrow lobbying . ' 1 2 5  
mterests . 
In addition ,  individual involvement will also le ad to increased 
transparency and use of the dispute resolution system. Transpar­
ency of procedures and decisions is a crucial part of building the 
leaitimacy of any organization . As private actors use the system 
a;d become comfortable with the rules , it wil l  build momentum 
and its use will increase.  This promotes understanding and, in the 
end, confirms the legitimacy of  the organization and its p roce­
dun�s .  
- · 1 1  . . 1 1 f . . 1 "  1 t- tna. y, exammmg tne ro e o pnvate actors m mspute r esotu-
t ion  is consistent with a l iberal IR app roach . The level of indi­
vidual part icip at i on can vary w ith each of factors ex<n ined in 
Sect ion 3.  This level of participation clearly affects how govern­
m e n ts order their preferences and wLich segments of society J.re 
most represented in dispute resolution . Increased individual in­
volvement would certainly broaden the spectrum of society so­
represented, and perhaps affect government preferences to act 
more legitimately in its own decisionmaking. 
4.3. Individual Participation Will Increase the Elfecti·veness of 
International Organ izations 
Granting private actors standing will also promote the effec­
tiveness of the underlying trade agreement . Private act o rs can 
make the determination when a violation is of sufficient harm to 
bring a case. We neither rely on states policing one another, with 
all of the attendant political concerns, nor rely on an oversight 
body, which may have political concerns and l imited resources o r  
research capabilities. Better policing o f  a trade agreement w i l l  oc­
cur if enforcement relies on those who are most invested with 
protecting their rights and benefits under the trade agreement. 1 26 
The result of better policing is twofold. First, more enforce­
ment actions will be brought, and second, these actions will be 
narrowly tailored to deal directly with the particular law causing 
harm. In the area of trade law, this direct involvement makes 
sense. The trade agreements are designed to  influence private ac-
125 "k See At1 , supra note 26. 
126 See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Resolution Under a North A merican Free 
Trade A rea: The Importance of the Domestic Legal Setting 12 CAN.-U.S. L.J .  329, 
332-333 (1987) . 
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tor behavior based on state promises . The state promises to lower 
tariffs,  or eliminate barriers,  or reduce taxation. In exchange, 
companies invest, start businesses, or increase trade. 'When those 
state p romises are broken-laws are not changed or new barriers 
are erected-it is private actors who suffer the consequences . As is 
the case with human rights, individuals should have some re-i ?7 ' 1 d · 1 • • • 1 r 1 , course . - We h ave a rea y recogmzec th1s 1n tr. e  area or a b o r  
• ' I I T • 1 L . 0 . . (' " '( 0"'\ J nghts u nder tne 1nternat10na. abor rgamz.at1on .L � . ano. 
1 • 1 ......  • • I )  Q 1 , 
even u nder (he 'X'TO for mtellectuai p roperty nghts .  · - v  Under 
i 'i-1 P I "{ (� ·w o k' . �  .... s' o rg' nl'zar ; ons can 'b r; n rr ''l " "'"' t-. ·--- t""() J-· ·1 � ...... . 1,�c ... .. �� ...... ... -� L --' , . .  ' f '-1 • aJ. , -' 1 •. . " " :'-. _. v "  . . • . .: .t l " th - "-d . ·-'·- t_ a.:.� .) 
; n  � L.. ,.::!I ,· ...- c.. ·"lo .;.:.· 1 � r- ' o1 d 1 1 -..- :\....(} 1  ;- ,.. •"\ . r· , . ... r .: v- <- � 1 29 .d L ; l •- ::.1 "'"' 0 1  numan .- 1bnts an aoor ! l 011 c:> <>gar.1" L a .., L a l::: . 
U,., ,-i - r L "' /) a · p n  - "'1 � dP R 't <-er-1 " � t"l 'i�' r?-• 1 · l T) ,.. "' n- - u  .. . del  . Ik . •  -' t} �·-m.enL on ,a - - �  e e:L ._. 11 , .... . � - - -�,1 _, l op '- A '- .Y 
-- · · ' c · -- R T ')S") · ' 1' 1 1 l I ' · · ' K1ghts ( · l cul · , pnvate actors W l  o e  a o 1 e  w bnng cases m do-. c 1 .  uo I . , h . . mesttc cou rts 10r noncomp 1ance . t 1s somewhat anac1rOELS t ! C:  
l . ' d . l h ld b . . h I ' .  anu cunous t l1at tra e ngnts s ou e movmg I n  r .,e otner G1 rec--
t10n. 
1 27 PETERS.tvlA!'.JN, supra note 1 0, at 8 ("Political theor;, and historical expe­
rience (e.g. in the context of EC law and of the Europ ean Convention on Hu­
man Rights) confirm that granting act ionable rights to seli:-iacerested citizens 
offers the most effective incentives for self-enforcing liberal constitution."') .  
1 2 8  See id. at 33 & 62 (1 997) . 
po Tl I . al L b 0 . . 1"IT " ") T . . - ·  1 e  mernatton a or rgan1zat ton � �U utl , !Zes a tnpartne svs-
tem divided into government , employment ,  and labor t o  promote the global 
recognit ion of human and labor rights. The Governing Body consists of 23 
government members, 14 employer members, and 1 4  worker members. Com­
mittees and delegations for annual conferences are similarly structured. The 
ILO is unique in allowing organizations of employers or workers to allege non­
C?mpliance complaints against the con_rracting states . . Alth_ough p�i;_ate indi­viduals are not allowed direct access wnhout the bacbng of an estao.lished or­
ganization, the democratic process is strengthened by the employers' and 
workers' involvement . See Petersrnann, supra note 10, at 433-34 (commenting 
that the increase of private individual participation "reflect[s] the democratic 
functions of international l iberal mles and organizations for the participation of 
individual rights"). See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEIDE LA CRUZ ET AL,  
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION (1996) (providing overview of 
the ILO procedures) . 
130 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Pro;Jerty 
Rights, Apr. 15 ,  1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Or­
ganization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND vo!. 3 1 ,  33 I.L.M. 1 125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] The 
TRIPS Agreement recognizes that mtelfectual property rights are private rights. 
Although implementatwn is at the discretion of the members, the agreement 
encourages recognition of private party participation. 
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4. 4. Responding to the Democracy Deficit 
631 
Of the existing models of dispute resolution, clearly the EU 
provides for the most individual involvement. Individuals are di­
rectly granted rights and the standing to protect those rights. 
Court decisions are supreme to national law and, can be inte­
grated directly into the domestic legal fabric. The procedures and 
rulings are transparent and highly accessible to private actors. Fi­
nally, enforcement through the domestic legal system gives the 
best chance that the judgments of the supranational court will be 
followed. While no model of dispute resolution can be com­
pletely de-politicized, the EU best tries to ensure that member 
states comply with international trade law without allowing them 
to make short-term, narrow decisions about compliance. 
In comparison, other trade organizations fall short. Invest­
ment arbitration under ICSID or UNICTRAL does provide for 
limited democracy. It has the advantages of allowing investors to 
bring cases against states when their rights have been violated. 
Furthermore, increased enforcement of arbitration awards makes 
it likely that states will comply and pay the damages awarded. 
The problem with this type of model, however, is the limited 
scope of the arbitration action. First, the rights provided in 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA or in bilateral investment treaties are the 
most basic of free trade rights. States can protect, and have pro­
tected, their most sensitive national issues and industries in the 
agreement in the first place.131 Second, an arbitration decision 
does not change the law of the offending state and any settlement 
can also be kept private if the parties so wish. In this way, a state 
can choose to pay in order to continue to break the law. Third, 
since this is a single arbitration case, rather than an authoritative 
court decision, a state can deal with this one instance quietly 
without creating the problem of numerous cases brought on the 
same issue. Although arbitration reduces the likelihood of cap­
ture somewhat in terms of the choice as to when to bring a case, 
the scope of the rights and the decision are severely limited. 
The WTO model also provides only partial answers to the 
questions of political capture and institutional effectiveness. The 
new procedures and enforcement capabilities of the WTO are de-
131 See NAFTA, supra note 65, arts. 1120, 1138, annexes 1120.1, 1138.2, chs. 
21, 32 (noting several exceptions). 
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signed to reduce dramatically the link between trade and domestic 
political interests.  Once a dispute is brought to the \XfTO, a state . , ,  . h 1 ' · 1 · 'd  ' . . t. 1-. l T1 Wll i have muc ess a01 ny to avo1 complymg ·:;nt i l  Llc . aV'l . ne 
fault of the \'VTO, and other systems thac rely on states to bring 
cases, is that the lack of rights and the lack of standing for private 
act o rs make the system less responsive t o  1:he citizenrt and less 
democrat ic in the end. Under the WTO, privat.� acto rs must rely 
on their governments to assert and defend 1:heir trading rights . 
. .  . h h E  h b h r  l' l l .· - (' 1 • -,. .-..... - 0 """" -:-- ,;_; "t ("l r  ..... , 1 - . .-.., · .- � r r· . ,- r Ic 1 "  , ro n K  ._ aL t e U . as  e,__u '· 1 ·- ... v .. �,::, u i  c n e · .. eE1oc ra.._y 
1 ( ' • • , • h ' l  d d' . • ·  , . r . aeucn: de bate .  \YJ 1,1  e I o not 1spute t he valwny ot argurnent m 
f • , . j . . I ··� -c ., ' re e n�nce to the leg1s_at1ve process !n t n e  ;� u ,  �:ve ne,E:t:i to recog-
. i L. � -u, l' h . . ., .  r 1 mze t nac C .t. te .L s accomp 1 S 1  ments 1n p cov1ctmg t o r  aemocracy 
in its dispu.te resolut ion are unique . 
4. 5. Objections to Individual Pa1ticipation 
t here are numerous objections to the incre-ased par-uCipation 
of private actors in international trade organizations. I wil l  focus 
on three of them. 
4. 5. 1 .  States Will Not join InternationaL Organizations 
The first objection could  well be that states will be more re­
hJctant to j oin organizations that give their citizens such power. 
Involving private actors means that the government has less con­
trol. over dispute resolution and, ultimately, the  legal interpreta­
tion of the treaty. 132  This distrib ution o( power to the citizens 
rather than the government can be threatening to states risky for 
them. 
This objection has been raised most frequently in the case of 
human rights organizations where states are reluctant to either 
join the organization or are reluctant to sign the additional proto-1 1 • 1 1 ' . b . b 1 1 h . . . lJJ co wtucn wou d permtt cases emg rougnt oy t e1r cltlzens. 
Therefore, the argument goes, states will not j oin  trade agree-
i32 This objection has also been used in the app l icat ion of extraterritorial securities laws, where the argument has been made that the existence of private 
plaintiffs improperly moves the locus of foreign policy decisionmaking from 
the executive branch to the judicial branch. See Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterrito­
riality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 1 993 SUP. CT. REV. 
289, 320-2 1 .  . 1 13 F 1 f . . 1 • I I"" �-·R 1 .... � - or ex<!mp e, o the 140 countnes wno are parties to tne �._,(_,1' on y 7) 
have ratified the Optional Protocol. See ICCPR, supra note 32;  Optional Pro­
tocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 19 ,  1 966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ,  6 I .L.M. 383 . 
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ments if their citizens can enforce it against them. However, this 
objection overlooks the key difference between these types of 
0 . h . h . r agreements. · )ther governments create 1 uman ng •• ts treaues ror 
the purpose of protecting citizens from the actions of their own 
- - 114  ,• 6 '
. j 1 h d h . h 1 • government. - \." dlens n.ave ong a t e ng t un a er mterna-
tiom.l law to be protected from abuse and their home state has 
1 ' l 1 • , " ' d' . f 1 • 1 ') '"" ong na<::c tne ngnt to ueman reparat 1on or tne1r 1:1a1-rn .  Unc: 
1 c .,.., : ,_ __ �ar; � c. rl r n  . . ,..e,..� t hese . d ' 'd r;l _ ;_  f � '  , .. . r1 � - � ' "  rn ecnauLoH1 C1 1 ... cc l•-U . v  pro,_ <�L . l ll lVl Uc-t l 1):;.1 i.S • .. •.Ckc < ... J. il u-
mail rights treaties is  w allow the individual to sue his or own 
government for viob.:: �on of their rights under the ir:J::errLli ional 
treny . 
,. . '· , · , ·1 • · · •I lnternat1 D l1J�1 Ir·:1.:Je tr-eaties, nov1ever, are comp_ete lyr d. _ltiere l1I 
in thei r purpose and in the benefits accruing to each scat e .  \]vhile 
human rights ::n.;?ttics could be characterized as ambit. iou.s in that 
all sr��es are individ ually responsible for protecting their citi-
1 ) )  ' • r 1 . h zen s ,  a trade agreement 1s more ot a contractua treaty wn 
promises and exchanges between each of the member states . 
There are strong econornic reasons to  j oin these trade agreements 
beyond the altruism and rrwral leadership that motivates signature 
of human rights treaties. In addition, while private actors could 
bring a case against their own government if private actor panici-
1 3 ' On example is the U.N. CHARTER: 
We the peooles of the United Nations determined . . .  to es­
tablish conditions under which j ustice and respect for the ob­
l igations arisina from treaties and other sources of interna­
tional law can be maintained, and to promote social grogress and better standards of life in large freedom . . .  and 1or these 
ends . . . to employ international machinery for the promo­
tion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples 
See U.N. CHARTER, preamble. For another examples see the ICCPR, supra 
note 32 ,  pt. II, art . 2 ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its ju­
risdiction the ri9hts recognized in the present Covenant.") ;  Nigel Rodley, On the Necess ity of tn� United States Ratification of the lnternati�naL Human R ights 
Conventzons, m HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES, WITH OR WITHOUT RESER­
VATIONS? ,  3 ,  15 (Richard B .  Lillich ed. ,  1985) ("I would be remiss if I did not 
reaffirm the principle of the inherent desirability of providing individuals who 
think chey have been victimized by their governments with a forum for brirw­
ing such alleged victimization to the attention of an international body .\?) 
(regarding the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis­
crimination) . 
135 See 11ARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
13 -14 (1993) . 
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pation were permitted in international trade agreements, that is 
hardly the sole purpose of allowing private actor participat ion.  
Arguably, private actor standing undermines the authority of 
h . d . 1 1 6  P f -N · 1 1 t, e government to negotiate tra e treaties . - ro esso r  _ 1cno s 
argues that domestic groups opposing their governments would " 1 " 1 3 7  -� · h '  h 1 d create a soectac e. h rst, t 1s assumes, somew at conaescen -
ingly, that' other states and trade bureaucracies could not distin­
guish between the government and private parties or -�f1terest 
· r  1 • • · d · � - 1 · l ' o , groups 11 tnev took ODDosmg s1 es m ulSDute reso utt o n .  - ::,cc-
ond, this mis�es t he p�i�t of a dispute res� lution procedu re. Dis­
pute resolution is designed to resolve disagreements afu:r an 
agreement is signed. The extension of standing in dispute resolu­
tion does not, for better or worse, give these private actors <l voice 
as the trade agreement is being negotiated. 
In the end, the benefits accruing from internation2l t rade 
agreements will  outweigh nations' reluctance to j oin organiza-­
tions where their own citizens could have standing .  For example, 
Turkey has had a traditional reluctance to recoj?nize individual rights and standing under human rights treaties1 but has appar­
ently calculated that the economic benefit of joining the EU out­
weighs these concerns and so has appl ied for EU membership. 
A separate objection could be t hat individual participation is 
neither appropriate nor efficient given the particular goals of the 
international organization.  The idea that certain o rganizations 
would not benefit from individual participation, is an important 
one in evaluating when and how private actors should be in­
volved. Clearly, a blanket statement that private actors will  al­
ways improve an organization is  na'ive . The distinction between 
"faci litative" and "producing" international organizations, made 
by Kenneth Abbott in outlining mesoinstitution theory,  would 
136 See Philip M. Nichols, supra note 22, 3 16- 1 8  (1996) .  
137 See id. at 3 17. 
138 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by 
Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17  U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L. 
359, 374 (1996) .  
139 Turkey has not sicrned the ICCPR or the Protocol to  the European 
Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR") providing for individual standing. See 
ICCPR, supra note 32; Protocol No. 9 to the 1950 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force, 
Oct. 1 ,  1994, Europ. T.S .  No. 1 40 .  
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' h d 1 ' . h 140 ·rt- ' 1 r h . . perhaps s ,e tne most llg t .  the goaL ot t e orgamzatwn was 
"facilitative" -public awareness, convening negotiations, organiz­
ing meetings-then private actor involvement appears to be less 
compelling. As the goals of the organization becomes more 
'' producing," i . e . ,  adjudicating behavior, creating norms, setting - . . J 1 1 • 0 0 1 "  ' h ne<.rotlatlon ag0enaas , ana the orgamzatwn 1s more centra 1zec1, t e !:) ' ! ......... 
. r . , , , . Th anportance o pnvate actors become more compellmg. ese 
' . . . b 1 ' ' ' f p i·�:;d.ucing organ1Zatwns ecorne La\'YTilakers and the concerns o 
·· , ...... 1 • • ! • d �" 1 1 cernocracy and legltlmacy rnust be r:::cogmzec . 1�ernaps one of tne 
1 • 1 • J d l . . h . 0 rcasc; n s  thiS (1ebate over uem.ocra.cy an ' eg1umacy as ansen 1n 
chc Lrsi: place is that more trade r.)rganizations are moving along 
the facilitative-producing continuurn to become more important 
• . 1 • f .  . 1 1 p i -! -, i c. •"r  • n  t -� e  C,.. "':J.� l 0 r1 0 l n r n r-r> �1 [ i '' fl "-0 1 l'lW r' .!. C  ... ) "--· l ,) �,. ..:._ ..._ . 1 1  1 \.... � l- ..:. 1.-\..- - - ..o. C- - 0  � • .1 !: � � 
4. 5. 2. Individual Participation is Logistically Unfeasible 
Another objection to individual part icipation is that the m e­
chanics of such a system would overwhelm the structure of the 
trade o rganization. m A corollary of this argument is the fear that 
there will be numerous frivolous suits or  that individual participa­
tion will  be l imited to the wealthy. 142 
While the logistics of involving private actors are undoubtedly 
complex, this is hardly a reaso n  not to set up an organization 
properly. Certain standing requirements or a screening system, 
such a s  exists with the European and Inter-American human 
· ' 143 ld b 1 ... 1 .  h d 144 Th . f 1 . . . nghts systems, cou e estao 1s e . e 1ssue o og1st1CS 1s 
140 See Kenneth Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Meso institutions: The Role of For­
ma{ Orr;an izations in International Politics (unpublished manuscript on file with 
autnors) . 
1 � 1 Ambassador . John Mc�onald not�s that the bureaucracy and funding reqUlrements of settmg up such a system snould not be underestimated. See In­
terview with John McDonald (Ambassador to International Labor Organiza­
tion) (rv1arch 17, 1998) ; see also Nichols, supra note 22, at 3 12-13 (casting doubt 
on the practically of a system that would allow equitable, direct participation 
by all the world's citizens) . 
142 See Nichols, supra note 22, at 3 1 8- 19 . 
143 
. 
� 
. H R" ' N See Amencan ConventiOn on uman 1gnts, ov. 22, 1969 ,  9 I .L.M. 
673 (1970) ; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 2 1 3  U.N.T.S .  22 1 .  
144 See Glen T .  Schleyer, Note, Power to the People: A llowing Private Parties 
to Raise Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORD. L. REV. 
2275 (prooosing a Commission for Free Trade to screen disputes for the WTO) ; 
see also Shell, supra note 138 , at 375 (noting that both th.e United States Su­
preme Court and the E.C.J .  have established rules regulating standing that, 
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an issue of money and support for the organization.  It  is a ques­
tion of what the member states choose to support .  The expansion 
of the \X'TO legal service in comparison to the p revious service 
under GATT demonstrates what can be accomplished with the 
will  of the governments. 
The concern about the availability of the necessary resources 
to pursue i nternat ional remedies is a valid one. It is, however. the 
sa�e concern that should exist in the current s ituation where, pri­
vate actors need resources in order to lobby their governments . 
Arguably, leaving it to each private actor to evaluate his o r  her 
ece:nornic gains and losses from b ringing a case provides for less 
distortion than filtering that choice through the nat io nal gover n-
ment . 
4. 5.3. Trade is Politics 
A final obj ection to  individual involvement could be  that the 
premise behind separating trade and domestic p olitics is inher­
ently flawed. This argument maintains that ultimately pol itics 
and political interests should determine the enfo rcement of  trade 
agreements. Individual injustice, if it occurs, is  n ot really the fo­
cus of trade policy. Trade policy focuses on the good of the state 
as a whole and the government is in the best position to deter­
mine that interest . This objection goes back to the idea that di­
plomacy, secrecy, and negotiation are the best way to handle dis­
putes between sovereign states. 1 4 5  The process of judicial ization­
which individual involvement moves forward-is not appropriate 
for trade policy. 
This obj ection attacks the heart of how one thinks about the 
international system. If trade should be bound to politics, if  states 
should be the focus of the international system, if diplomacy is 
the best way to resolve disputes, my proposal is  yet another step 
on the slippery slope of giving more power to citizens and erod­
ing the sovereignty of states. On the other hand, if  increased le­
galization and judicialization of international l aw m ake the inter-
. l ff . d . 146 h h . nat10na system more e ect1ve an more respons1ve, t en t 1s 
while not perfect, are sufficient to satisfy participants in the system that deci­
sions are not political judgments) . 
t4s N' h 1 1c o s, supra note 22, at 3 19 .  
146 See Petersmann, supra note 95 (explaining the importance of increased 
judicialization in the GATT context) . 
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proposal might hold some i nterest . 147 It is really a question of 
o n e ' s  views the continuin g  evolution of the international system .  
Incre::1sed legitimacy and democracy are appropriate goals under a 
vii:'Yv· of liberal governance. 
5 .  CONCLUSION 
The an:icle i ntended to demonstrate two things. I\Ay first goal 
vre'tS �:c> tum -che focus to dispute resolution as a way of dealing 
. • � 1 d ' . 1- . . f . . ' 1 d -·�l l Lh s<:: .rne Ol_ tne tra 1t1ona cr1t 1ques o ... 1 rlternationa1 tra e tJ r-. . T . . d . . 1 1 - • • • • • l h l ' b  ga �"l iZ2.'c:�Jns.  .t. :ncrec1Slrtg 1 n  r·vrGllal p:J.ttlclpat!Ol1 adaresses t e . 1  -
.._. ,... .! ; ·n·t- .c ;· n <""l � l pl �: C"' • n l •·'  .'' ��� :::.. "'  ·�\ r"O • r. . h <'  1 . .[ _; ··- o e 1 •"-'- .d c ' '- l l •o.Lona r._ ac10IL, goa " u1 r::. X.unl  . .ulng L . ..... ro e O.t pi .va�.._ 
a.cc o r:.; b.ehind the state . Individual particioation can also be used 
r d 1 l . " .  L f d . . as ::� me2.sure or emocracy ana tegrumacy o tra e orgamzatwns. 
Finally) I argue individual participation can help reduce the issue 
, c  C'' 071 ' r"" .._, .t ��1 \.. J  ...... . 
My second goal was i llustrating that as regional and interna­
tional organizations are created, states should examine carefully 
the type of dispute resolution mechanism they establish.  148 Inter­
national trade organizations diminish the returns of the treaty by 
limiting their dispute resolution mechanisms to states. By provid­
ing rights without a remedy) these international trade organiza­
tions ?.re limiting both their impact and their legitimacy. The so­
lution is to reduce the l ink between domestic or short-term 
1 4 7  See Joel P.  Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution,  17 
U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L.  33,  58 (1996) (arguing that judicial institutions make 
imernation2.l trade agreeme�:lts more binding and more attract ive) ; see also Steve 
Charnovitz, Participation oj Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade 
Organ ization, 17 U. PA. J .  INT'L ECON. L. 3 3 1 ,  343-46 (1996) (arguing that in­
creased transparency of the WTO system is inevitable and aopropriate) ; G. 
Richard Shell, supra note 138 ,  at 37 4 (arguing that issues which p�t governments 
against governments and governments a�ainst interest groups will not result in 
confusion on the position of each entity ; YARBROUGH & YARBROUGH, supra 
note 2 1 ,  at 86-106 (discussing how the evelopment of "minilateralism" or the 
creation of supranational institutions for small groups of countries leads to 
more effective trade l iberalism) . 
148 Some focus has already been given to the impact of different dispute 
resolution mechanisms on emerging organizations and I this will hopefully con­
tinue. See Taylor, supra note 70 (examming NAFTA and MERCOSUR) ; Gar­
cia, supra note 1 1  (analyzing the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA ") 
and applying the mesoinstitutional theory) ; David Lopez, Dispute Resolution 
zmder a Free Trade A rea of the A mericas: The Shape of Things to Come, 28 INTER­
AM. L. REV. 597 (1997) (discussing the alternatives for developing a dispute 
resolution mechanism under the FTAA) . 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
638 U. Pa. f. Int'l Econ. L. [Vol 19 :2  
political interests of states and their trade policy by granting pri­
vate actors standing to bring cases for treaty violation. 
The arguable purpose of international trade treaties is broad 
encouragement of trade by requiring, at the outset, that member . k 0 h , 1 1 , ff 0 d"  " d  1 states do not ta e actiOns t. at womc ac:vf�rse1y <J. �ect m lVl· ua 
players. The rights provided in these treaties and the benefits 
therefrorn accrue most directly to pri vate actors, and only to their 
governments indirectly through bener economies, m o re t ax in·· 
d ' . 'T'h , r · ' , . . corne. an\ reelectiOn. 1 e benents or t r;�cle t reat ies are best D ro-
: 1 (" d b 1 � - ' [ '- ' " t"rtPd aiJrl L'n rorco y tt"!OS" m ost Q l r'"'·-r ' ·v ,, · ·r .� ,-,.. ,,,  '-" '-'  ..... 1 ....... 1,...... l ... \.... ..l 1,...... ... ... l_. l.,... - J. ,I '""'. 1 'I..- ...... t. ...... - " .  
To examine the EU, although it poses its o wn quest:ions about 
the democracy deficit , is to obs�rve an interr:.ational organization 
. , • 1 · h · 1  1 ·  f I ·  h "� commlttecl to ensunng tn.at t e gu wet : nes set ort.n m L e: 1 reaty 
of Rome are followed. The dispute resolution system in the EU 
guarantees more compliance by allo1;v! ng private actors directly 
affected by each country's  actions to bring cases in the national 
courts (and in certain cases to the ECJ directly) . 
This result allows for the use of private attorneys general to 
enforce the law based o n  their own assessment of the harm they 
are suffering and the cost of litigation devoid of political concerns. 
In the EU system, we do not rely on states, each of which may 
have an interest i n  allowing others to cominue violating the treaty 
or may not want to bring a case against another state for polit ical 
reasons. \'Vhen we are left to rely on states to enforce the law un­
der a trade treaty we are left with an incomplete system. 
If states are actually committed to the trade t reaties they sign 
and to bringing the benefits of those treaties to their constituents, 
they must allow their own citizens to bring cases directly to the 
dispute resolution mechanism established under the treaty . Fur­
thermore, these cases should not be decided under arbitration, as 
is the system under NAFT A for investor disputes. An ever­
changing arbitration panel creates neither a uniform body of law 
nor precedent and, in the end, can never carry the weight of an 
international standing body. 
As the number of regional and international trade agreements 
grows, their dispute resoluti on mechanisms will only increase i n  
importance . I n  order to ensure real change in the t rade laws and 
real compliance by the const ituent states, we must provide for in­
dividual standing . Rights without a remedy are holl ow rights. 
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